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Abstract 
Deference to committees in Congress has been a much studied phe-
nomena for close to 100 years. This deference can be characterized as the 
unwillingness of a potentially winning coalition on the House floor to impose 
its will on a small minority, a standing committee. The congressional scholar 
is then faced with two problems: observing such deference to committees, 
and explaining it. Shepsle and Weingast have proposed the existence of an 
ex-post veto for standing committees as an explanation of committee defer-
ence. They claim that as conference reports in the House and Senate are 
considered under a rule that does not allow amendments, the conferees en-
joy agenda-setting power. In this paper I describe a test of such a hypothesis 
(along with competing hypotheses regarding the effects of the conference 
procedure). A random-utility model is utilized to estimate legislators' ideal 
points on appropriations bills from 1973 through 1980. I prove two things: 
1) that committee deference can not be said to be a result of the conference 
procedure; and moreover 2) that committee deference does not appear to 
exist ·at all. 
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1 
Introduction 
· The influence of standing committees on legislation in Congress has 
been of scholarly interest since Woodrow Wilson's time. Wilson described 
committees as "dim dungeons of silence" which could bottle up legislation at 
will (Wilson, 1885). The idea that members of Congress defer to committees 
has remained a stylized fact to this day. Despite the longevity of the literature 
on the subject, there has yet to be any systematic empirical research proving 
the existence of deference to committees. There is a growing consensus that 
the committee reforms of the 1970s have lessened the degree of deference to 
committees in Congress, but the subject remains one of interest. Building on 
recent work by Shepsle and Weingast on the role of conference committees 
in affecting legislation, I will develop a model of strategic action by both 
standing committees and their parent chambers leading to the conference 
committee. This model explores the tension inherent in the relationship 
between standing committees and their parent chamber. I will then develop 
a method to test the model by using appropriations legislation over an eight 
year period. I prove two things: 1) that committee deference can not be said 
to be a result of the conference committee procedure; and 2) that committee 
deference does not appear to exist at all. 
By convention, House conferees on legislation have been members of 
the standing committee that initially considered the bill. When the mem-
bers of a standing committee represent their parent chamber in a conference 
committee they are granted agenda-setting power in the sense that they make 
the final proposal, and it is considered under a closed rule in both chambers 
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(Shepsle and Weingast, 1987a). Thus it is hypothesized that sophisticated 
conferees can use the influence conferred by their agenda setting power to 
affect the final outcome of a bill. Furthermore, in 1974 the House passed 
Rule X, clause 6(f), specifying that a majority of conferees must be "members 
who generally supported the House position as determined by the Speaker" 
(Rules of the House of Representatives, 99th Congress, p.9). This suggests 
that the appointment of conferees by the House will be strategic, and based 
on the preferences of the members of the standing committee which pro-
posed the legislation. Assuming that the Speaker is an agent of the majority 
party in the House, it is hypothesized that the conferees will have a median 
ideal point that is acceptable (i.e., preferable to the status quo) to a majority 
within the majority party in the House (Nagler, 1989). This theory of so-
phisticated behavior by conferees provides several hypotheses to test. Stated 
in broad terms, the hypothesis examined here is that the conference com-
mittee procedure allows standing committees to influence legislation, within 
parameters established by the preferences of members of the majority party. 
To test this hypothesis requires a test of committee influence. Commit-
tee influence can be defined as the ability of a committee to obtain outcomes 
desirable to the committee, for which there is a majority-preferred alterna-
tive available to the full chamber. It follows that in order to observe com-
mittee influence one must know what a committee wants (the committee's 
median will suffice for this, assuming the committee is a unitary actor in a 
single dimension) and what the entire chamber wants (the entire chamber's 
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median, again assuming the chamber is a unitary actor in a single dimen-
sion). Krehbiel and Rivers have proposed a test of committee influence 
using a random utility model to estimate legislators' ideal points (Krehbiel 
and Rivers, 1987). However, whereas Krehbiel and Rivers attempted a test 
of committee influence on a single bill, I will try to establish a statistically 
significant pattern of committee influence over a set of bills. I view this 
large scale empirical test of the committee deference phenomena as major 
contribution of this work. 
In this paper I will apply the theory of congressional behavior de-
scribed above to the House and Senate Appropriations committees. Using 
the methodology proposed by Krehbiel and Rivers I examine the commit-
tees actions over the period from 1973 through 1980. The two appropri-
ations committees are studied for methodological reasons, not substantive 
reasons. Appropriations committees pass bills that cover the same subject 
year after year. Thus time series data are available. And their bills are eas-
ily quantifiable, lending themselves to econometric tests. Furthermore, the 
consideration of appropriations legislation in Congress is very regular. The 
initial action on appropriations legislation is almost always the reporting of 
the legislation by the House Appropriations committee. This is followed by 
consideration on the floor of the House, and passage of the bill with or with-
out amendments. After passage by the House, the Senate committee reports 
a version of the bill to the floor of the Senate. The Senate then passes the bill 
with or without amendments, and a conference committee to reconcile the 
two chambers' versions is called for. This routinized sequencing of events 
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makes the process simpler to model, as every year the legislators work with 
the same amount of information about what their fellow legislators have 
already done. 
Choosing one pair of committees to study obviously limits the general-
ity of the conclusions: there is no way to know if other pairs of committees 
follow the same patterns of behavior. However, if the assumptions that un-
derlie the model are clearly stated, then one can determine whether other 
committees' behavior should be explained by the model offered. And, if 
one is restricted to only one pair of committees, better Appropriations than 
Government Operations. The Appropriations committees deal with bills 
of major substantive importance that members presumably have strongly 
held preferences on. The Appropriations committees also deal with one of 
Congress's most fundamental roles, its power of the purse. In addition, the 
Appropriations committees and the appropriations process have been stud-
ied before (Fenno, 1966, Pressman, 1966, Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1985a, 
1985b). Moreover, studies of the budget process as a whole exist (Wildavsky, 
1974, Schick, 1980). And the incentives of the bureaucracy- - the organi-
zation which Congress budgets for - - has also been examined (Niskanen, 
1971). Hence this work will build on an established tradition. 
Several models of strategically motivated behavior by committees and 
their parent chambers will be developed. Each model addresses the same 
question: how can Congress delegate work to committees and yet allow the 
entire body to maintain effective input into legislation? The models focus on 
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the conference procedure-- the penultimate stage in the legislative process 
- - as the institutional mechanism within Congress that tests this question. 
Concurrent with this examination I consider the ways in which the par-
ent chamber may mitigate the standing committee's influence on legislation. 
I then specify the configurations of preferences under which a committee 
enjoys an ex-post veto. This allows me to offer predictions for behavior by 
the Speaker, by committees, and by the entire House. This work repre-
sents a step forward from the earlier analyses of conferences by Ferejohn 
(1975), Vogler (1971), and Steiner (1950). Those researchers were not able 
to offer a means of predicting the outcomes of conferences, while such a 
method is presented here. Also presented is an application of this method 
to a precedent-setting case in the House of Representatives. 
Such a theoretical exercise does not take place in a vacuum. Confer-
ence committees determine the fate of much important legislation (Shepsle 
and Weingast, 1987b). And the importance of the conferees has not been lost 
on members of Congress. Members of the House have in the past questioned 
the goals of their representatives in conference (Clapp, 1963): 
There is a little line in the instructions which says that 
the chairman of the conferees will attempt to carry out 
the will of the House regardless of his own personal 
feelings about it. Now, I have never seen that rule 
observed. 
And more recently, in describing alleged conferee abuse over HR1718 
- the Emergency Appropriations Bill for 1983 - Senator Spector (R-Pa) 
claimed (Congressional Record, March 22, 1983, p. S3637): 
It as a case of Gaston and Gaston. It was not even a 
case of Gaston and Alphonse. When the conference 
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was in session the chairman of the House committee 
said "We yield to the Senate position," and was then 
interrupted by the chairman of the Senate committee 
saying "Oh, no, you cannot yield to our position. We 
insist on yielding to your position." (emphasis added) 
This paper is organized as follows. First is a review of the relevant 
literature on both deference to committees, and the conference commit-
tee procedure. Second, a review of Shepsle and Weingast's theory, which 
holds that the agenda-setting power of conferees explains the observance of 
committee deference. Third, a description of the institutional features of 
the House of Representatives and an analysis of why, and under what con-
figurations of preferences of the actors, these institutional features make a 
variation of the ex-post veto theory applicable to many legislative situations. 
Fourth is an examination of the actions of the House of Representatives, the 
Education and Labor Committee, and the Speaker during consideration of 
minimum wage legislation in the context of the theory developed. Following 
this I turn to a broader empirical examination of the questions at hand. In 
this section the relationship of the committee to its parent chamber is fur-
ther developed. Next, I consider the conference report itself, and what the 
strategies described imply for the selection of conferees. I then summarize 
the hypotheses generated, and offer a discussion of the overall model devel-
oped. Finally, the remainder of the paper describes the methodology and 
data used to test the hypotheses developed, and the results of those tests. 
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Overview of Literature 
While there is a voluminous body of literature on standing committees · 
in the House of Representatives, and a respectable-sized body of literature 
on conference committees, the intersection of the two has rarely consisted of 
more than the common word in their subject headings. Work on standing 
committees can be divided into three types: 1) descriptive work focusing 
on the internal workings of committees; 2) rational-choice work assuming 
that members of congress are purposive actors whose behavior can be ex-
plained based on their goals; and 3) game-theoretic attempts to formally 
model congressional behavior and explain, among other things, why mem-
bers of congress would defer to committees. Another useful category of 
work, that attempting to empirically test the theories described in the earlier 
categories, is reserved for later consideration. Calling some work 'descrip-
tive' is perhaps harsh, for there was 'theory' involved. However, 'internal 
integration', and 'systems analysis' did not provide the causal explanations 
of behavior, or predictive capacities, associated with more rigorous expla-
nations. 
All of the ink spilled on committees suggests a widespread belief that 
they are important. I will not attempt to cover all the literature describing 
the inner-workings of committees~ Instead I focus on three areas of com-
mittee research: i) explanations for why we would expect committees to be 
important because of self-selection to committees (hence skewed distribu-
tions of preferences in the committees compared to the chamber) coupled 
with log-rolling or vote trading; ii) formal explanations suggesting why the 
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rules and procedures that congress ·- - and the House in particular - - op-
erates under should give influence to committees; and iii) the small amount 
of empirical literature available testing theories of committee deference. 1 
This latter group may be broken into two types: those that test directly for 
committee influence on roll-call votes, and those that look for congressional 
outputs that suggest the influence of committees. The latter test offers an el-
egant way to avoid the problem of inference from roll-call votes; but makes 
tests of explanation of committee power, rather than existence of committee 
power, difficult. 
In his seminal work, Fenno described committees based on mem-
ber's goals, environmental constraints, and strategic premises (Fenno, 1973). 
However, rarely (in fact almost never) has this literature evaluated commit-
tee success on the floor (Dyson and Soule, 1970; Lewis, 1978; Krehbiel and 
Rivers, 1989). When it has, such success has generally been measured prior 
to the conference stage. 
The literature on conference committees has either been done at the 
aggregate level across standing committees, with no comparative perspective 
among the different types of committees; or has consisted of case studies 
of the success of single committees in conference (Vogler, 1971; Fenno, 
1966). Both types of work have precluded any comparative analysis across 
committees. When such authors did break their work down by committees, 
they did not. evaluate why some committees had different success rates in 
conference. And till recently no attempt was made to relate success in 
conference by a standing committee to success for the committee within the 
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chamber. I attempt to integrate work on standing committees and conference 
committees. 
Fenno opened his 1962 article, "The House Appropriations Committee 
as a Political System: The Problem of Integration", with the comment that: 
Studies of Congress by political scientists have pro-
duced a time-tested consensus on the very consider-
able power and autonomy of Congressional commit-
tees. 
As careful a scholar as Fenno was, he did not offer any references to back 
up this claim. And apparently he chose his words very carefully. The 
notion of powerful committees had been tested by time, but not by any 
empirical research. In fact, 11 years later Fenno began his 1973 seminal 
work Congressmen in Committees with: 
This books rests on a simple assumption and conveys 
a single theme. The assumption is that committees 
matter. (emphasis added) 
Fenno, as others, claimed that committees mattered, and hence felt justified 
in studying how they worked internally. 
This belief that committees matter has variously been tied to their 
agenda-setting role, their expertise, and ideas of cooperation and log-rolling. 
However, with all the emphasis on what committees do or do not say there 
has been little to suggest that the floor listens to what they say. The first 
empirical piece on committee success on the floor did not come until 1970. 
Without characterizing all the literature, it is safe to generalize that virtually 
all of it assumes - - explicitly or implicitly-- that committees are influential 
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on the floor (Fenno, 1973; Manley, 1970). Committees' roles as bill writers 
or agenda setters would not count for much if the floor simply did as it 
.Pleased with bills once they got there from committee. 
I: Rational Choice Based Explanations of Committee Power 
In his 1974 work The Electoral Connection Mayhew articulated the 
goal that is the cornerstone of virtually all rational choice work done on 
Congress: the assumption that members of Congress' first goal is to be re-
elected. Mayhew's work was important because he described the behavior 
of individual members of Congress based on that goal. Mayhew was able 
to define three tactics - - position-taking, credit claiming, and advertising 
- - and argue forcefully that they were all the result of members' desire 
to be reelected. Position taking meant simply that a member of congress 
announced a position on an issue that was thought to be favored by his/her 
constituents, without necessarily any intention of ever delivering any public 
policy changes on the issue. Credit claiming meant claiming personal credit 
for some act of the congress, most notably some benefit that accrued to the 
member's district. Advertising was distinct from credit claiming in that it in-
cluded the advertising of character traits or facets of the candidate's services 
that could be available, not merely goods that had already been delivered. 
Along with citing behavior as designed to achieve electoral goals, May-
hew also argued that Congress as an institution was designed particularly 
well to suit members' electoral needs. And he cited the committee system 
in this argument. Mayhew tried to show how committees served all three 
elements of his electoral prescription. 
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Taking his cue from Fenno, Mayhew pointed out that several com-
mittees, Public Works and Interior among them, operated with a modus-
operandi to pass requests from members on the floor. This buttresses May-
hew's re-election argument: he argued that this policy was an attempt by 
committee members to please other members of the chamber by giving them 
awards they could claim credit for. But this certainly does not indicate that 
committees have power; rather, to the contrary, it suggests that commit-
tees are subservient to the desires of members on the floor. Mayhew also 
noted that some studies had shown that committee members appeared to get 
more of the spoils their bills produced than did non-committee members, 
which would enhance the members' credit claiming opportunities (Plott, 
1968; Goss, 1972). But Mayhew did not attempt to explain this phenomena. 
In addition to the credit claiming benefits committees could provide, 
Mayhew specifically claimed that they were endowed with both advertising 
and position-taking benefits. Citing HUAC activities of prime examples of 
both advertising and position-taking Mayhew quoted Shils (1951): 
The congressional investigation is often just the instru-
ment which the legislator needs in order to remind his 
constituents of his existence. That is the reason why 
investigations often involve such unseemly uses of the 
organs of publicity. Publicity is the next best thing to 
the personal contact which the legislator must forego . 
It is his substitute offering by which he tries to coun-
teract the personal contact which his rivals at home 
have with the constituents. 
Mayhew did not explicitly test his hypotheses that electoral desires in-
ftuenced both congressional behavior and congressional organization, rely-
ing instead on the mostly anecdotal evidence collected by others. However, 
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absence any tests of his hypotheses, Mayhew did lay the groundwork for the 
past 15 years of research on Congress. 
In his 1977 book Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment 
Fiorina attempted to explain just how the organization of Congress serves 
members' goals so successfully. The book attempts to expla.in the disappear-
ance of 'marginal ' congressional districts, districts featuring close elections. 
Briefly, Fiorina argued that it is through their relationship with the bureau-
cracy that members of Congress are able to insure their electoral goals. He 
writes: 
political observers are aware that cozy little groups 
of congressmen, bureaucrats, and interest group rep-
resentatives make numerous day-to-day policy deci-
sions. What has been less obvious is the manner in 
which the number of these subgovernments has been 
proliferating as the power of the twenty-odd full com-
mittees has been dispersed among the 120-odd sub-
committees. If they so desire, most congressmen now 
have the opportunity to head up a subgovernment. 
Fiorina did not dwell on committees achieving success on the floor . 
It was not influence within the chamber that he felt was essential for com-
mittees. Fiorina argued that it was influence in the bureaucracies - - the 
subgovernment-- that made committees important. 
If we are convinced that committees provide the means to further mem-
bers electoral goals via credit claiming, position taking, or advertising; then 
we would expect to see members choosing committees based on the particu-
lar committees' advantages towards reelection. In his 1978 work The Giant 
Jigsaw Puzzle, Shepsle showed tJ:tat members do indeed make committee 
choices based on the committees electoral resources. 
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With only data on committee assignments it is impossible to gauge the 
value of the assignments to a member of Congress. For when the member 
chooses he/she must take into account the probability of being given his/her 
committee of first choice. It is unlikely that a freshman member of Congress 
would ask to be put on the Appropriations committee if the probability of 
being assigned there were only 10%. However, we wouldn't infer from this 
that the freshman wouldn't value a spot on the Appropriations committee. 
Detailing the procedure used to select committees, Shepsle showed 
that requests for particular committees were a function of the legislator' s 
constituents' characteristics. Having data on both requests and assignments 
Shepsle could take into account a member's subjective prior of receiving a 
given committee slot. This enabled him to interpret the relationship between 
member's characteristics, and the value they placed on different committees. 
The arguments presented above only show that committees may be 
important for reelection, they do not offer any evidence that members dis-
play the deference to committees that would give committees the desirable 
properties supposed. In "A Rational Choice Perspective On Congressional 
Norms" Weingast attempted to describe why it would be rational for mem-
bers to defer to committees (Weingast, 1979). In fact, Weingast attempted to 
explain why it would be rational for members to defer to everyone (which 
would obviously cover committees). He showed that under certain assump-
tions of the costs and benefits of projects that legislators would be better off 
adopting a 'Universal Legislative Game' (ULG) rather than a 'Distributive . 
Legislative Game' (DLG) . 
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Weingast basically made only two assumptions to reach this conclusion. 
His first assumption was that: 
where b; represents the benefits for a project to district i and c; represents the 
costs to district i (b; = b/'<li , j and e; = c/V'i, j ) . 2 This is a strong assumption, and 
leads Weingast fairly quickly to conclude that the more projects, the better. 
He also assumes that under a DLG a minimum winning coalition will form 
(with N + 1 members from a legislature with 2N members), and that each 
member has an equal chance of being in the winning coalition (WC). This 
gives us the probability of being in the winning coalition, a, as: 
Now, it is straightforward to calculate the expected value to each legislator 
of the two different games: 
EV [ULGJ = b - c, 
EV[DLGJ = a(b - ac) + (1 - a)(O - ac) = a(b - c). 
This means the difference in expected values can be expressed as: 
E V[U LGJ- E V [DLG] = (1 - a)(b- c), 
since by assumption b > c, it follows immediately that EV[U LG] > E V[DLG]. 
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While Weingast thus shows that the universal legislative game will 
leave legislators better off than the distributive legislative game; he does 
not answer the question of why individual legislators do not bolt from the 
universal game and form the distributive one. Hence he offers us a reason 
why legislators are better off cooperating; but he does not tell what enforces 
that cooperation. 
In his article "The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists" Axel-
rod attempts to explain why such a cooperative game can exist even without 
an apparent enforcement mechanism (Axelrod, 1981). Axelrod 's approach 
is unique. He examined populations of individuals who would interact with . 
each other over time in Prisoner's Dilemma situations. In other words, two 
individuals would play a non-cooperative game with the usual Prisoner' s 
Dilemma payoff matrix: they . would be punished for finking on one an-
other, yet it would be individually rational to do so. Axelrod offered the 
following matrix with sucker payoff 0, reward for cooperation 3, temptation 
to defect 5, and punishment for mutual defection 1: 
[Table II- 1 Here] 
Table TT - 1 
cooperate defect 
cooperate (3,3) (0,5) 
defect (5,0) (1 ,1) 
note: payoff to row chooser listed first 
note: increasing payoffs generate increasing utility 
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The analog to a legislative body is apparent. A group of legislators may 
be better off playing a Universal Legislative Game (to continue with Wein-
' . 
gast's terminology); but if they need to play this game over consecutive V()tes 
then they will find themselves in a Prisoner's Dilemma situation as legisla-
tors who were already rewarded during a previous period will be tempted 
to fink during the next period. Axelrod observed the contrast between ear-
lier descriptions of the Senate as being characterized by "falsehood, deceit, 
treachery", and later descriptions claiming that " it is not an exaggeration to 
say that reciprocity is a way of life in the Senate" (Smith, 1906; Mathews, 
1960). Axelrod claimed that: 
I will show that we do not need to assume that Sena-
tors are more honest, more generous, or more public-
spirited than in earlier years to explain how coopera-
tion based on reciprocity has emerged and proven sta-
ble. The emergence of cooperation can be explained 
as a consequence of Senators pursuing their own in-
terests. 
What Axelrod claimed was the difference between the two time periods 
mentioned was increased tenure of Senators. The increase in tenure meant 
that Senators would be more likely to deal with each other often, and more 
importantly, again after any given vote. 
Axelrod defined the value of a game to a player to be: 
where Pt is the payoff at time t and w is the discount parameter. 
Axelrod offers two inte·rpretations of w: 1) that it is a standard discount 
parameter, indicating that future rewards are not valued as much present 
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rewards; or 2) that it incorporates the likelihood of the future interaction 
occurring. As Axelrod claims, either way it is strictly bounded by 0 and 1. 
However, for the purposes of his argument he interprets it the second way. 
Given this interpretation Axelrod claims that it is because of an increa~e in 
w over time that cooperation has increased. 
Considering a simultaneous move game where threats were unenforce-
able and each player had no knowledge of the other's move, Axelrod proved 
several theorems about the viability of different strategies. First: 
Theorem 1: If the discount parameter w is sufficiently 
high, there is no best strategy independent of the strat-
egy used by the other player. 
This suggests only that in choosing a strategy, an individual member 
will have to consider what other members are doing. This in itself would not 
tell us much. However, Axelrod went on to show that Tit-For-Tat-- the 
strategy of cooperating on the first encounter with someone and on every 
future encounter doing what that individual did to you on the previous move 
- -was a dominant strategy. It was dominant in the sense that if everyone 
were employing Tit-For-Tat, then provided the discount parameter is high 
enough it would be impossible for any other strategies to invade it. And 
Axelrod was able to put specific conditions on the discount parameter for 
this: 
w > m.ax ----[ 
T - R T - R ] 
- T - P'R - S 
The implication for legislatures is clear. Cooperation is a stable strategy: we 
do not observe members bolting from ULGs because in the long run (and 
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there is a long run) it would not be the optimal strategy. Axelrod went on to 
prove that even small groups of individuals employing Tit-.For-Tat entering 
a larger body would eventually dominate. 
Formal Theories o/Committee Power 
There is an entire other set of formal theories of legislatures built 
around spatial models of voting. Plott ' s majority rule conditions and McK-
elvey 's chaos theorem provided a major problem for theorists (Plott, 1967; 
McKelvey, 1976). Plott showed that majority rule is generically unstable 
in two dimensions or more; given almost any set of preferences there will 
exist no point that is a majority rule winner over every other point. And 
McKelvey showed, again in two dimensions or .more, that given control of 
the agenda it is possible to construct a series of amendments that will make 
any point a winner under a binary voting scheme. Taken together the two 
results indicate that, absent any institutional constraints, we can not predict 
any outcomes, because any outcome is possible. Needless to say, this would 
not bode well for the research of students of legislatures. 
However, in "lnstitutional Arrangements and Equilibrium m Multi-
dimensional Voting Models" Shepsle found a way to both circumvent the 
problem of majority rule instability, and build a case for why chambers 
would appear to defer to committees. He introduced the concept of a struc-
turally induced equilibrium (SIE) enforced by the jurisdictional system and 
germaneness rule of the House (Shepsle, 1979). Shepsle showed that if the 
jurisdiction system were such that each committee had the ability to make 
changes only in one dimension, and that the agenda was such that only one 
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committee could offer amendments, then there would be a unique SIE. Kre-
hbiel and Denzau and Mackay have used this notion to describe scenarios 
' 
when a chamber would be expected to defer to a committee proposal (Kre-
hbiel, 1987; Denzau and MacKay, 1983). And Krehbiel and Gilligan, and 
Ferejohn, have documented examples of committees taking advantage of in-
stitutional rules in Congress that allow for such equilibrium (Krehbiel and 
Gilligan, 1985; Ferejohn, 1985). Later on in the exposition of the theory of 
this paper I elaborate on such spatial models. 
II: Empirical Results on Committee Deference 
There are at least two reasons for the lack of proof of floor influence. 
First, if one only looks at committees' success on the floor, then it did appear 
for a long time to the casual observer that committees were unbeatable on 
the floor. Once Committees' bills got to the floor they were invariably 
successful (Dyson and Soul, 1970). Second, to determine more precisely the 
success or failure of committees requires knowing what committees want, 
and what the house wants. Assuming legislators are behaving strategically, 
then success rates on the floor can be meaningless, for the bill the committee 
reports may not represent its median. 
Dyson and Soule produced the first major study of floor results (Dyson 
and Soule, 1970). They looked at committees' success on all roll call votes 
from 1955-1964. According to them, a success occurred when the majority 
of the committee voted with the winning side on a roll call vote, or, i:o. other 
words, when the majority committee position carried. The obvious problem 
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with their analysis is that they equate success on roll call votes with influence 
on roll call votes. 
We_shall speak of successful committees to the extent 
they are able to realize their desires in Congress, i.e., 
committee recommendations are supported. ( empha-
sis in original) 
This success is only influence if: 1). the committee reports sincerely, and 2) 
the committee has different preferences than the floor. If the first condition 
is not met than success can be an artifact of strategic reporting. If the second 
condition is not met then success can be an artifact of shared preferences. 
Hence while Dyson and Soule revealed an interesting statistical artifact; 
nothing they offered could tell us whether or not committees were indeed 
influential on the floor. 
Dyson and Soule did not have strong theoretical predictors of com-
mittee success on the floor. They attempted to determine the relationship 
between floor success and: committee attractiveness, committee partisan-
ship, and committee integration. The first independent variable was mea-
. 
sured simply by how many people wished to be on the committee, the third 
independent variable was measured by the cohesion of roll-call voting by 
committee members. They were not able to find significant relationships 
between the independent variables and committee success. 
Lewis modified Dyson and Soule's analysis by using the universe of 
bills reported rather than the universe of roll call votes as her data set 
(Lewis, 1978). She categorized the history of bills as either: 1) favorable 
floor action; 2) unfavorable floor action; 3) no floor action. Lewis does not 
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explain how she discriminates between (1) and (2). Presumably passage of 
the bill in any form counts as favorable floor action. This measure obvi-
ously does not account for committee influence, as the bill may be modified 
in a way obnoxious to the committee before passage. However, using her 
criteria Lewis found committees to be overwhelmingly successful at passing 
legislation. In other words, the house does not consider legislation unless it 
wishes to change the status quo in some way. 
Krehbiel and Rivers attempted to correct earlier studies of committee 
power by estimating actual ideal points of Senators for the level of the min-
imum wage (Krehbiel and Rivers, 1989). By comparing the median ideal 
point of committee members with the floor median they were not able find 
any evidence that the committee exercised any influence over the floor's 
actions. They did not attempt to prove this result for more than one case. 
Also , given the nature of the two chambers-- the greater size of the House 
and the stricter rules it operates under - - to find that Senate committees 
are not powerful, but House committees are would not contradict existing 
theory. 
Another set of papers attempt to determine committee influence not 
by floor activity (i.e., roll call votes), but by final outputs. Such methodology 
has several pros. But such methodology also has several cons. The benefits 
of this method are that one need not be concerned with legislative strat-
egy. As the outputs are the only thing being examined, what goes on inside 
Congress becomes moot. Using this method, Congress is merely a black box 
producing public policy outcomes. The only thing we need to know about 
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the insides of that black box is the membership of the relevant committee. 
We simply compare the benefits committee members receive from those 
" 
outputs to the benefits non-committee members receive from those outputs. 
The only assumption required is that all members of congress prefer more 
benefits for their district to fewer benefits. 
However, there are at least two problems here. The first is that im-
plicitly a null model is assumed whereby each member would receive equal 
benefits in the absence of a committee structure. This is generally untenable. 
Given what we know about committee choice, we would expect this condi-
tion to be violated. For members who would a priori expect more money for 
their districts from agriculture programs are likely to be on the Agriculture 
Committee. And the same could be said for the Armed Services Committee, 
Interior Committee, etc .. 
The second problem with this method is that the public policy out-
come must be one where we can measure the benefits to a given legislator 
or district. This implies some sort of a distributive policy. We can not dis-
criminate between districts on the benefits of public policies that are not 
distributive in nature. 
In one of the first articles of this type, "Nonmarket Decision Making", 
Plott acknowledged the first of these problems (Plott, 1968). He analyzed 
decisions by the Banking and Commerce Committees on funding for Ur-
ban Renewal authorization. However, he realized that members may have 
chosen to be on these committees precisely because their districts were ones 
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most likely to receive such grants based on criteria other than their commit-
tee membership. Plott attempted to solve this problem by gathering time-
series data . and comparing how districts did when represented on one of 
the relevant committees and when not represented on one of the relevant 
committees. Plott found that a district's level of benefits almost doubled dur-
ing periods coinciding with committee membership. In an unusually blunt 
conclusion Plott claimed that: 
districts represented on the House Banking and Cur-
rency Committee are favored ... (but) on the qualifi-
cations side it is sufficient to say that shortcomings of 
the data are severe. 
The data problems Plott refers to are the measurements of where the benefits 
go. Some districts encompassed several metropolitan areas, by which Plott's 
data was broken down. 
In "Military Committee Membership and Defense Related Benefits in 
the House of representatives," Goss examined the Armed Services Commit-
tee of the House as well as the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense 
and the Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction during 1968 
(Goss, 1972). Goss attempted to estimate the amount of employment (both 
civilian and military) generated in each district by military activity. Goss 
attempted to solve the problem of self-selected committee members by pos-
tulating several factors that might affect military employment, and holding 
those constant to examine if there were any incremental effect from commit-
tee membership. While this strategy is sound, her reliance on bivariate tables 
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rather than multivariate analysis makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions 
from her research. 
Goss postulated that legislators' age, seniority, party, voting record, 
region, an? history of military service would be related to their districts ' level 
of military employment. 3 Goss does in fact show that holding these variables 
constant one at a time, committee members do seem to have more military 
employment in their district than non-committee members. However, the 
set of variables she chooses does not at all disprove the theory that committee 
members may be self-selecting based on military employment rather than her 
items. 
In "Congressional Influence Over Policy Making: the Case of the 
FTC," Calvert, Moran, and Weingast look for influences of congressional 
committees over the regulatory actions by an arm of the bureaucracy 
(Calvert, Moran, Weingast,_ 1987). Their empirical results provide some 
evidence to support their hypothesis that committee members are more in-
fluential than floor members over the FTC. While this does shows deference 
to committees by the executive branch, rather than by congress, we can infer 
that the entire chamber is allowing the committee this greater say in agency 
oversight. 
III: Role of the Conference Committee 
In "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power" Shepsle and 
Weingast isolated the conference procedure as a particular institutional fea-
ture of Congress that is a source of committee influence (Shepsle and Wein-
gast, 1987a). They postulated that standing committees had the option of ex-
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ercising an "ex-post veto" by refusing to come to agreement when represent-
ing their chamber in conference committee. While Shepsle and Weingast 
overlooked some of the details of the rules regarding selection of conferees, 
their basic thesis -- that the requirement of conferees to come to agreement 
with their counterparts from the other chamber and offer a proposal under 
a closed rule offers a rich strategic opportunity for the conferees - - in-
vites a wealth of meaningful, testable hypotheses concerning the conference 
procedure. 
This focusing of attention on the conferees ' role in the conference 
procedure is a welcome development. In 1975 Ferejohn was able to claim 
that "there is no area of congressional decision-making about which there 
is less academic consensus than there is about the conference committee" 
(Ferejohn, 1975). Literature on conference committees had up to this time 
revolved around the question, "who wins in conference committee?" How-
ever, the only winners proposed were the House or the Senate, never any 
of the other actors or units involved, such as the standing committees or the 
conferees. 
Steiner examined conferences from the 7oth through soth Congresses 
(1928-1947) and concluded that the House view was predominant more often 
than was the Senate view (Steiner, 1950). Steiner's estimation of "who won" 
in conference was strictly subjective. He analyzed what he felt were the key . 
issues of disagreement between the chambers, and chose the winner based 
on the resolution of those issues. 
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In "Patterns of One House Dominance in Congressional Conference 
Committees," Vogler examined conferences in the 79th, soth, 83Td, ggth , and 
ggth Congress, thus spanning 22 years and 596 conferences. Anyone at-
tempting a "who wins" analysis of conferences must have some means of 
determining who won. Vogler used the report in Congressional Quarterly, 
looking for key phrases such as "conference bill closest to bill as passed 
the House" and "conference bill split the difference". Unfortunately, Con-
gressional Quarterly reported the "who won" status of only 295 of the 596 
conferences covered in Vogler's period. Vogler reported the following sum-
mary results: 1) the Senate won 59% of conferences, the House won 32% 
of conferences, and 9% were settled via split the difference; 2) during peri-
ods when the Republicans controlled both houses the percentage of Senate 
victories was slightly higher, and 3) during periods when the Democrats con-
trolled both houses the percentage of House victories was slightly higher. 
Vogler offered a traditional interpretation of his results. He claimed 
that since the Democrats had a longer tenure as the majority party, they 
would utilize subcommittees more in the House than Republicans would 
when they controlled the House, and hence the House conferees would 
be especially better informed than their Senate counterparts. This would 
presumably enable them to strike a better bargain in conference. Alterna-
tively, Vogler pointed out that perhaps the Southern Democrats entrenched 
in committees were able to go to conference committee and resist the Senate 
conferees who were representing what was thought to be the more liberal . 
chamber during this period. This is an intuitively appealing notion, but it 
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can only be half an answer. It may have been that the Democratic conferees 
were not willing to compromise with their Senate counterparts because of 
their own preferences. However, this does not explain why the presumably 
liberal Senate conferees went along with the measures advocated by the 
Southern Democrats from the House. 
Vogler did break his data down by committee and found that some 
committees were much more successful than others in conference. However, 
without some theory behind these differing success rates Vogler's tables are 
uninterpretable. He did attempt to supply some answers, or ideas for where 
to look for those answers. He suggested identifying the actors interested in 
the conference process, including interest groups, staff, the executive, and 
"the conferees' electoral, legislative, and executive constituencies." Vogler 
argued that "we would expect the legislator's sources of both influence and 
cues to be quite different in conference situation than they are in a floor 
vote or even a committee." He then hypothesized that it is a committee's 
prestige within its chamber that leads to its success in conference committee. 
However, he pointed out that "such an observation is not easily translated 
into a testable hypothesis." Given the difficulty in measuring or defining 
"prestige," Vogler was probably right about this. However, if prestige is 
something that happens to be observationally equivalent to the committee 
and the chamber having shared preferences, then Vogler 's conjecture - -
once prestige is replaced with this notion of preferences-- becomes testable. 
Fenno examined conferences on appropriations bills-- considering a 
subset of federal agencies- - from 1947 through 1962. Determining the win-
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ner by assuming sincere reporting by each chamber (i.e., assuming that each 
chamber appropriates its median) Fenno observed that the resulting appro-
priations were closer to the Senate figure about 65% of the time (Fenno, 
1966). Manley analyzed only conferences between the House Ways and 
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee for 1947-1966. He 
concurred in Fenno' s observation that the Senate did better than the House 
in conference (Manley, 1970). Like Fenno, he determined the winner by 
comparing the result to the bills passed by each chamber. 
Aware of the problems of strategic misrepresentation, Ferejohn 's main 
goal seemed to be to contribute a method for determining which chamber 
has won a conference (Ferejohn, 1975). He studied a particular case - -
conferences on appropriations for the Army Corps of Engineers from 1951 
to 1967 -- and offered a model for determining a chamber's success rate. 
Ferejohn compared the number of programs the House wanted to start and 
the number of programs the Senate wanted to start. He concluded that the 
House was better at having such programs approved by the conference com-
mittee. Of course he is vulnerable to his own criticism, he cannot be sure 
that the Senate did not propose an inordinately high number of new projects 
knowing that some fraction of them would not survive the conference com-
mittee. 
Strom and Rundquist attempted to explain the observed phenomena 
of the Senate's dominance of the conference procedure gathered by these 
studies (Strom and Rundquist, 1977). They argued that the sequencing of 
the legislative process was crucial to the conference stage. They claimed 
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that whoever went second in the legislative stage would have an advantage 
in conference as they would merdy have modified the other chamber's bill . 
.... 
Presumably this would put them in a better strategic position. The intuition 
is that the bill reflects the preferences of the first chamber, the differences 
reflect the preferences of the second chamber. Hence the second chamber 
is assumed to be more committed to the differences and attempts to pre-
serve them in conference. Whatever the validity of the intuition, replicating 
previous authors' studies Strom and Rundquist did find that it was not the 
Senate per se, but the chamber that went second that won most conferences. 
Implications for Standing Committees 
Vogler noticed some pattern of standing committee success in confer-
ence, but offered no theoretical basis for this pattern (Vogler, 1971). Fenno 
conjectured that a chamber's success in conference depended upon how 
well the conferees' preferences corresponded to the chamber's preferences 
(Fenno, 1966). Intuitively, Fenno was arguing that a chamber would only 
appear successful in conference if its conferees were trying to come out of 
conference with something close to the chamber's bill, rather than to the 
conferees' own preferred position. However, Fenno did not relate this back 
to the committee's success in the chamber, he was only interested in ex-
plaining why one chamber appeared to be more successful than the other. 
The Shepsle-Weingast thesis offers a means of exploring the pattern Vogler 
observed. Or, alternatively, the pattern Vogler observed offers a means 
of testing the Shepsle-Weingast thesis. Theoretically, the Shepsle-Weingast 
thesis can be viewed as a corollary of Fenno's conjecture. 
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According to Fenno: 
The Senate is stronger in conference because the Sen-
ate Committee and its conferees draw more directly 
and more completely upon the support of their par-
ent chamber than do the House Committee and its 
conferees. 
Another way to make this claim is to argue that those committees did well 
whose preferences coincided with the preferences of their chamber. This is 
consistent with the model examined later. If the chamber shares the com-
mittees preferences then there will be no attempt by the committee to act 
strategically and placate the chamber, and no attempt by the chamber to 
choose conferees not representing the committee median. This will no doubt 
make the committee and the chamber appear more successful in conference. 
Again, having made this observation, it is seen that Shepsle and Weingast 's 
theory of committee power is simply a corollary of Fenno's earlier suggestion 
on the basis of committee success in conference. 
The Gap 
The articles cited represent an impressive amount of effort spent ex-
amining the results of conferences. And despite their initial focus on which 
chamber "wins" in conference both Fenno and Vogler perceived that the 
relationship of the relevant standing committee to its parent chamber was 
crucial to the success of a chamber in conference. However, Vogler felt 
that the key to understanding this phenomenon was a committee's prestige 
within its chamber. Fenno cited a consensus within the parent chamber. 
Both these scholars were on the right course. However, neither was working 
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with a question that they could hope to answer. Neither explicitly shifted the 
focus of their re$earch to answer the question "when does a standing.com-
mittee win in conference?" or "when does a standing committee attempt 
to produce an outcome from conference that would make it appear as if its 
parent chamber had won?" The answer to the latter question is painfully 
clear: when the preferences of the members of the committee coincide with 
the preferences of its parent chamber. Thus Fenno was correct in searching 
for a consensus within the parent chamber. However, the necessary condi-
tion for success in conference is for the standing committee from which the 
conferees are drawn to represent that consensus. 
In some sense it is surprising that so little attention was ·paid by congres-
sional scholars to the differing interests of conferees and their parent cham-
bers. Clapp offered the following quote from his interviews with members 
of Congress (Clapp, 1963): 
I think it depends on the chairman of our conferees. 
Take _______ committee matters. The House generally 
goes beyond the vie"':'S of the committee chairman in 
passing bills relating to the committee's work. Yet he 
acts as chairman of our conferees when these matters 
go to conference. Since he is not favorable to the 
action of the House, he doesn' t defend it very long, 
and you usually get a different result in conference. 
Vogler believes that the hope lies in examining the prestige of a standing 
committee within its chamber. I would argue that the concept of prestige is 
misguided. However, what is important to realize is that such a notion can 
not lead to meaningful predictions as to when a committee will be successful 
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in conference. Even if we could identify prestigious committees as opposed 
to non-prestigious ones it would not tell us very much. The strongest pre-
diction we could make is that prestigious committees would be successful 
Y% of the time in conference, while other committees would be successful 
only X% __ of the time in conference. We would have no clue as to how to 
make a prediction in the case of any specific bill; for the theory ignores the 
content of the measure before the conference, it merely looks at the actors 
in the conference. 
A more complete theory would have such predictive power. It would 
take into account the content of the bill before the conference, the char-
acteristics of the conferees, and the characteristics of the two chambers. I 
will propose a theory that takes into account the preferences of the con-
ferees and the preferences of the members of the two chambers. I claim 
simply that a chamber will be successful in conference if it is represented 
by conferees who represent the parent chamber's preferences. This seems 
like a non-controversial statement. However, the essence of it seems to be 
lacking in the conference committee literature. And I claim that such a 
theory is empirically testable. If the conferees are members of the relevant 
standing committee then their preferences are available via the committee 
bill originally proposed to the parent chamber. What needs to be done is 
to compare the committee position, its parent chamber's position, the op-
posing chamber's position as well as its standing committee's position, and 
the conference report to determine both whether the theory would predict a 
"win" and whether there was a "win" for the parent chamber. Of course a 
.. 
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definition of a "win" would be essential to this enterprise. Defining a win in 
terms of movement towards the median of one of the two chambers or stand-
ing committees seems practical. For multi-dimensional bills the median on 
each dimension could be used. 
As Ferejohn points out, this approach is plagued with problems re-
sulting from possible sophisticated strategies by the actors. If each chamber 
believed that some "split-the-difference" bargaining was going to take place 
in conference then each chamber would intentionally exaggerate its pref-
erences in the bills it passed. For example, a more hawkish Senate might 
pass a 5% increase in defense spending even though a majority of Sena-
tors support a 3% increase. For the Senators know that when they get to 
conference they will have to negotiate down with members of the House 
who want a smaller increase. In fact, taking into account the opportunity 
for position-taking makes this process even more difficult to unravel. In the 
above example, even if a majority of the House preferred a 3% increase to 
no increase they might pass a bill allowing no increase knowing that this · 
position would be more helpful with their constituents. 
Thus the first thing required to correct previous studies of conferences 
is some measure of true preferences. Through the use of a random utility 
model I achieve this. By combining this econometric method with a coherent 
theory of conference committee behavior on the part of both committees and 
parent chambers I am able to shed new light on the conference procedure 
and its implications for committee power and legislative success or failure. 
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I've tried to show here that there is a large amount of literature explain-
ing why we should expect to observe committee deference, and a smaller lit-
erature that has attempted to find it. That smaller literature can be broken 
into two types: work that searches for committee influence directly on roll 
call votes on the floor ; and work that attempts to infer committee influence 
from the policy outcomes emerging from Congress. I will be working with 
the former of these two methods. And I will be trying to incorporate what 
has been researched on conference committees. 
A Precedent-Setting Case Study 
Introduction 
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It is a stylized and empirically verifiable fact that standing committees 
in the U.S. House of Representatives are able to obstruct legislation and ex-
ert disproportionate influence upon legislation that reaches the floor. 4 This 
is generally characterized as deference by the parent chamber to commit-. 
tees. It may also be called committee deference when the House refuses to 
use an institutional mechanism at its disposal -- the discharge petition - -
to force a popular bill out of a committee. But committee deference is an 
observation, not an explanation. Once this observation has been made, a 
theory of Congressional behavior should attempt to explain why such defer-
ence is rational. The theory should explain why members of Congress defer 
to committee proposals on the floor, and why the discharge petition has not 
been used more frequently. 5 
Shepsle and Weingast offer just this sort of explanation (Shepsle and 
Weingast, 1987a). They argue that a committee's power to determine the 
fate of a bill in conference committee with the Senate -- after the House has 
worked its will on the floor - - is the mechanism that enforces committee 
deference. After legislation passes the House and the Senate, a conference 
committee is one of the methods of resolving differences between the cham-
bers. By convention, House conferees have been members of the standing 
committee that initially considered the bill. By failing to come to agreement 
in conference these conferees can kill legislation after it has passed through 
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both chambers (Bach, 1984). Hence conferees enjoy "ex-post veto power" 
(Shepsle and Weingast, 1987a). 
However, House. rules do not mandate that the House conferees be 
chosen from the standing committee that initially considered the bill. Rule 
X, clause 6(f) of "Rules of the House of Representatives" specifies that mem-
bers of the House appointed to conference comm"ittee shall be members who 
"generally supported the House position as determined by the Speaker." If a 
committee's bill is modified on the floor, the Speaker may appoint conferees 
who supported the floor position rather than the committee position. Thus 
standing committees do not necessarily enjoy an ex-post veto. The exis-
tence of an ex-post veto depends upon the Speaker's decision as to whether 
the committee members "supported the House position." So it is useful 
to develop strategic decision-making criteria for the Speaker, and test their 
implications for committee behavior and the existence of the ex-post veto. 
I assume that the Speaker is an agent of the Democratic members (ma-
jority party) of the House. I then specify the configurations of preferences 
under which a committee enjoys an ex-post veto. This allows me to offer 
predictions for behavior by the Speaker, by committees, and by the entire 
House. This work represents a step forward from the earlier analyses of 
conferences by Ferejohn (1975), Vogler (1971), and Steiner (1950). Those 
researchers were not able to offer a means of predicting the outcomes of 
conferences, while such a method is presented here. Also presented is an 
application of this method to a precedent-setting case in the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
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Such a theoretical exercise does not take place in a vacuum. Confer-
ence committees determine the fate of much important legislation (Shepsle 
and Weingast, 1987b ). And the importance of the conferees has not been lost 
on members of Congr~ss . Members of the House have in the past questioned 
the goals of their representatives in conference (Clapp, 1963). And more 
recently, in describing alleged conferee abuse over HR1718 -- the Emer-
gency Appropriations Bill for 1983-- Senator Spector (R-Pa) accused the 
conferees of bending too far towards the House position. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First is a review of the properties 
of the observed phenomena (i.e., the influence of committees) utilizing a 
simple spatial model. Second, a review of Shepsle and Weingast ' s theory, 
which holds that the ex-post veto explains the observance of committee 
deference. Third, a description of the institutional features of the House of 
Representatives and an analysis of why, and under what configurations of 
preferences of the actors, these institutional features make a variation of the 
ex-post veto theory applicable to many legislative situations. Fourth is an 
examination of the actions of the House of Representatives, the Education 
and Labor Committee, and the Speaker during consideration of minimum 
wage legislation in the context of the theory developed. 
Theory 
Following convention, I assume that the set of possible legislative out-
comes (bills) lies in an N-dimensional Euclidean space. Legislators are as-
sumed to have preferences over these outcomes, and the institution is as-
sumed to have a set of rules constraining the way in which outcomes are 
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considered (Shepsle, 1979). In addition, several restricting assumptions are 
made about the rules and preferences. The set of rules is assumed to parti-
tion the space into M jurisdictions, each of one dimension, and assigns one 
jurisdiction to each committee. 6 Furthermore, each legislator is assumed 
to have Euclidean preferences. On any given dimension a legislator has a 
most preferred point (an "ideal point"), and given two points in that dimen-
sion, he/she prefers the point closest to his/her ideal point. The assumption 
of unidimensionality corresponds to the germaneness rule of the House. If 
legislation on the level of the minimum wage is being considered, then an 
amendment to raise taxes would not be allowed; it is not germane and would 
not be on the same dimension in the policy space. 
Three points in any dimension will be essential: 1) the status quo (SO); 
2) the committee median (C); and 3) the House median (H). One can think 
of these points as representing amounts of spending on some good or service. 
The status quo refers to the state of the law if no bill is passed. When dealing 
with a spending bill it is the amount of money that would be spent if no bill 
is passed. The committee median is the median of the committee members' 
ideal points, i.e., the ideal point of the median voter of the committee. Again, 
in the spending bill scenario, it is the amount that the median committee 
member would wish to spend: half the committee members would prefer 
to spend more and half would prefer to spend less. The House median 
is defined similarly for the entire House. Note that, according to Black's 
theorem, the House median would be expected to defeat all other proposals 
in a floor vote conducted under an open rule (Black, 1958). 
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A fourth point will also be useful: the sophisticated proposal. The 
sophisticated proposal is the proposal most preferred by a majority of a 
committee's members that would be expected to receive support by a majority 
of the parent chamber against the status quo (i.e., that would be expected to 
pass). This is the proposal that a sophisticated committee (either a standing 
committee or a conference committee) would make if it were proposing a 
motion under a closed rule permitting no amendments. The committee's 
members will realize that the chamber's decision will be a choice between 
the proposal the committee offers and the status quo. Hence collectively, 
the committee's best strategy is to propose the point closest to its median 
that is closer to the chamber's median than the status quo is. This point 
will be denoted as SPc where Cis the median of the committee making the 
proposal (Denzau and Mackay, 1983) (Figure One). 
[Figure One] 
Two sets of circumstances are considered: first a case where the mem-
bers of a committee would choose to obstruct legislation by not reporting a 
bill; and second a case where the House would defer to a committee's pro-
posal on the floor even though a majority of members of the House prefers 
a different proposal. In the first case the committee is unable to obtain an 
outcome that a majority of its members would prefer to the status quo. But 
by not reporting any bill the committee is able to retain the status quo, which 
a majority of its members prefers to the House median H, despite the fact 
that a majority of the entire House prefers H to the status quo. This case is . 
the classic example of a committee's gate-keeping power (Figure Two). 7 
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[Figure Two] 
In the second case the committee is able to defeat the status quo with 
the committee median C: a point that a majority of the committee prefers 
to both the status quo and to the House median. This may occur despite 
the existence of the House median H that a majority of the House prefers to 
both C and SQ. Case two is distinguished from case one in that in case two 
majority coalitions within both groups (the committee and the whole house) 
prefer to move in the same direction from the status quo (Figure Three). 
[Figure Three] 
If the committee proposes its median C (which could be defeated on 
the floor by the House median H) and C prevails, we say this is an example of 
"committee deference" : the House has deferred to the committee's position 
for no apparent reason. 8 
The Puzzle of Deference 
Cases one and two appear paradoxical to the congressional scholar 
who believes that members of Congress are rational actors. In case one 
there is an institutional mechanism available to members of the House who 
prefer the House median (H) to the committee median (C): the discharge 
petition. Case two presents the seemingly perverse situation where a major-
ity of the members of Congress vote for a given bill despite the availability of 
a preferred alternative. Yet such perverse results are observed with enough 
frequency to suggest that a norm of committee deference exists. This "norm" 
is equivalent to an unwritten contract whereby members of Congress defer 
to the judgement of committees. 
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Ex-post Veto 
If a committee had an ex-post veto available, a!ld if a majority of the 
committee preferred the status quo to the House median, and a majority of 
the House preferred the committee median to the status quo, then it would 
be futile for a majority to try to alter the outcome on the floor from the 
committee median to the House median. The committee would be able to 
utilize its ex-post veto on the House median H, and the final result would 
be the status quo (Figure Four). 
[Figure Four] 
Shepsle and Weingast claim that a committee derives its ex-post veto 
power from its participation in a House-Senate conference committee. A 
majority of conferees from each chamber must approve the conference re-
port (Bach, 1984). Hence by refusing to come to agreement in conference, 
a House committee has the option of retaining the status quo. In fact, since 
conference reports reported with no amendments in disagreement are con-
sidered under closed rules for up-or-down votes, a committee going to con-
ference may have even more power than the term "ex-post veto" suggests: 
it may also have agenda-setting power in that it is the final proposer. 9 In 
terms of an agenda tree, the committee may, with the concurrence of the 
Senate conferees, select the proposal to appear on the final branch. 
It is one of the strengths of this theory that the preferences of the Sen-
ate conferees influence the final outcome. This gives the theory predictive 
power. If the preferences of four groups-- the Senate committee, Senate 
floor, House committee, and House floor-- are known, then it is possible to 
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predict the conference outcome. Hence the theory is testable; it says when 
committees should exert influence and when· they should not. During the 
' 
remainder of this paper, it is assumed for sake of simplicity that a majority 
of the Senate conferees will approve whatever the House conferees propose. 
This means that the power of House conferees will be oveFstated to some 
extent, for undoubtedly in many cases the preferences of the Senate con-
ferees, and the Senate bill, will limit the House conferees' options (Smith, 
1988). However, as committees are not random samples of their chambers, 
but rather groups of self-selected representatives trying to promote particu-
lar interests, it is reasonable to assume that both standing committees will be 
in agreement with each other compared to their respective chambers more 
than the 50% of the time that chance would indicate. 
Now looking again at Figure 3 it is easy to see why the committee's 
final proposer power makes it futile for the House to amend the committee's 
initial proposal C. If the House amended to H, then the committee would 
switch to C in conference and on the final vote on the conference report -
- that takes place under a closed rule - - the House would have to choose 
between C and SQ. Since a majority of the House prefer C to SQ the out-
come would be the same as simply approving C in the first place. Thus, 
if committees had ex-post veto power and final proposer power it would 
explain the phenomena of deference to committees on the floor that was 
described initially. However, rather than deference, it is seen that such be-
havior is merely an acquiescence to the institutional power that committees 
h ave been granted via their role in the conference procedure. In the next 
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section I shall draw upon the institutional rules governing the appointment 
of conferees and define the conditions under which a committee retains its 
ex-post veto and final proposal power. 
Institutional Details 
According to Rule X, clause 6(f) of "Rules of the House of Represen-
tatives" as amended in the 93rd Congress and again in the 95th: 
the Speaker shall appoint no less (sic) than a majority of members 
who generally supported the House position as determined by the 
Speaker. The Speaker shall name Members who are primarily 
responsible for the legislation and shall, to the fullest extent fea-
sible, include the principal proponents of the major provisions of 
the bill as it passed the House. 
The reason for such a rule is apparent from the theory and examples 
developed above. While prior to Rule X , clause 6(f) , the rules of the House 
specified that the Speaker would appoint the conferees, the standard practice 
was that the chair of the standing committee that proposed the legislation 
being sent to conference would submit a list of ·suggested conferees to the 
Speaker (Bach, 1984). The Speaker would then announce appointment of 
these conferees immediately upon passage of the motion to go to conference. 
The Speaker's appointments are not subject to a point of order (Deschler, 
1982). Rule X was expected to insure that if the Chair presented a list of 
committee members who did not support the House-passed bill, then the 
Speaker would appoint members who did support the House position and 
who would not attempt to resurrect the committee bill in conference. How-
ever, if it is assumed that the Speaker is an agent of the majority party in 
the House (i.e., if the Speaker acts as a majority of Democrats in the House 
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would want him to act), then this would not necessarily be the outcome of 
the rule change. For the Speaker would be expected to choose conferees 
representing the median Democrat on the floor, not the median House mem-
ber on the floor. Hence a committee's o-pportunity to exercise an ex-post 
veto will depend upon the preferences of the Democratic members of the 
House, as well as the preferences of the Senate conferees and the Senate 
bill. 
Conditions for Effective Ex-Post Veto 
Once in conference the conferees act as a committee operating under 
a closed rule. I assume that the conferees act sophisticatedly. Under this 
strategy the conferees would, if possible, propose a point that is not only 
preferred to the status quo by the conferees themselves, but one that is also 
preferred to the status quo by a majority of the House (Denzau and Mackay, 
1983). This assumption can be stated as follows: 
Assumption One (Al): 
The conferees will act sophisticatedly in that they will always 
report the bill closest to their median that would be expected to 
be passed by the parent chamber. 
Note that this assumption rules out the possibility of the conferees 
reporting amendments in disagreement. 10 Note also that in order to act 
sophisticatedly members of the committee must know the distribution of 
preferences of the members of the parent chamber. While this is implicit in 
assumption one, it bears stating explicitly: 
Assumption 1.1 (Al.l) 
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Committee members know the median ideal points of: the floor 
in the House; the floor in the Senate; the opposing committee; 
and Democrats on the floor. 
Speaker's Decision Rule 
It is impossible to consider institutional features without assuming that 
some of those features are exogenous - or at least fixed in the short run. In the 
case of proposal and selection of conferees I will make two such assumptions. 
The first assumption is that the committee chair's proposed slate of confer-
ees always represents the committee median; rather than some extreme view 
within the committee: such as the view of all committee Democrats. It ap-
pears that this assumption is empirically justified. Committee chairs do not 
propose slates of conferees representing only their party on even the most 
partisan bills. [Note that committee chairs propose slates of conferees; the 
Speaker actually selects conferees.] Rule X, clause 6(f) gives the Speaker 
an option: he/she can appoint a group of conferees representing the 'House 
position ', rather than the slate proposed by the committee chair. However, 
Rule X does not define the 'House position'; other than to define it as 'the 
House position as determined by the Speaker.' Thus my second assump-
tion constraining legislative behavior is that this last clause means that the 
Speaker may appoint a group of conferees representing the House median. 
By this assumption the Speaker has only two options: he/she may appoint a 
slate of conferees representing either the committee median, or the House 
median. 11 
Under the assumption that the Speaker is an agent of House 
Democrats, his/her· decision is based upon their preferences. If a majority of 
.. 
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House Democrats prefers the proposal expected by conferees representing 
the House median to the proposal expected by conferees representing the 
committee median, then the Speaker will appoint a group of conferees rep-
resenting the House median. However, if a majority of House Democrats 
prefers the proposal expected by conferees representing the committee me-
dian to the proposal expected by conferees representing the House median, 
then the Speaker will accommodate the House Democrats, and appoint the 
slate of conferees proposed by the committee chair. 12 
The assumptions regarding the Speaker's decision rule can now be 
stated as follows: 
Assumption Two (A2) 
The Speaker will appoint conferees representing the committee 
median if and only if the expected sophisticated proposal by these 
conferees is preferred by a majority of House Democrats to the 
House median. Otherwise the Speaker will appoint conferees 
representing the House median. 
An application of assumption two is offered in Figure 5. This is a 
case ripe for sophisticated placement by the committee. And further, a 
majority of House Democrats prefers the expected sophisticated proposal 
by the committee conferees to the House median. If the Speaker accepts 
the committee conferees as appointed by the committee chair then the final 
proposal to the floor would be SPc. Since a majority of House Democrats 
prefer the expected committee proposal to the House median, the Speaker 
would accept the committee conferees if he/she acts in accordance with 
assumption two. What remains is to specify general conditions under which 




The following proposition is stated without proof [see Figure 2]: 
Proposition 1: 
The conferees will have an ex-post veto available if and only if 
the conferees' median and the House median are on opposite 
sides of the status quo. 
What is necessary is to specify the configurations of medians among 
the House and the committee that will lead to ex-post veto power by the 
standing committee rather than by the conferees. In other words, when 
will the committee members find themselves enjoying the power to obstruct 
after legislation has passed on the floor? According to the Shepsle and 
Weingast model, the committee always has an ex-post veto. According to 
Rule X, the committee never has an ex-post veto, as the conferees should 
always represent the House median. Accepting assumptions Al and A2, 
it can be shown that neither is the case, but that the committee enjoys a 
symbiotic relationship with the Democrats (i.e., the majority party) on the 
floor. Proposition two specifies when such situations arise that convey ex-
post veto power to standing committees (all propositions assume that the 
Democrats are the majority party). 
Proposition 2: 
A standing committee will have an effective ex-post veto avail-
able if and only if: 1) the committee median and the Ho~se 
median are on opposite sides of the status quo, and 2) a majonty 
of Democrats prefer the status quo to the House median. 
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[Figure Six] 
Notice that proposition 2 covers a very limited set of situations. The 
requirement that the committee median and the House median be on oppo-
site sides of the status quo implies that this is a situation ripe for obstruction. 
Since sophisticated committees do not propose bills in such situations, the 
interpretation of proposition 2 is that once a committee has proposed a bill 
there is no threat of an ex-post veto. Hence the ex-post veto cannot ex-
plain deference on the floor. The threat of an ex-post veto can explain 
gate-keeping (obstruction) when a majority of House Democrats prefers the 
status quo to the House median. But the Shepsle and Weingast claim, that 
it is the threat of an ex-post veto that accounts for deference on the floor, 
cannot be accepted. 
However, there are interesting cases where a standing committee will 
go to conference and use its agenda-setting power rather than its ex-post veto 
power. The threat of utilizing final proposer power can explain committee 
deference on the floor. It is futile for the House to amend a standing com-
mittee's bill on the floor if the result of a conference committee will be the 
standing committee's original bill. So rather than describing the case where 
a standing committee will have an ex-post veto, those circumstances where 
the standing committee will retain final proposer power in the conference 
procedure are described. First, the following proposition is offered: 
Proposition 3: 
A standing committee has final proposer power if and only if: 
1) the committee's situation is ripe for sophisticated placement 
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under a closed rule, and 2) the standing committee's chair's pro-
posed slate of conferees is selected by the Speaker. 
Now, replacing the first and second conditions above with the require-
ments on preferences, proposition 3 can be restated as follows: 
Proposition 4: 
A standing committee will have final proposer power if and only 
if: 1) the committee median and the House median are on the 
same side of the status quo, and 2) the Democratic median is 
closer to the expected sophisticated proposal from the committee 
than to the House median (i.e., a majority of Democrats prefer 
the expected sophisticated proposal from the committee to the 
House median). 
In the next section I will discuss the consideration of minimum wage 
legislation in 1972, 1973, and 1977 in terms of the theory presented above. 
The 1977 legislative scenario will provide an illustration of proposition 4. 
Legislative History 
Consideration of minimum wage legislation in 1972, 1973, and 1977 
illustrates the dilemma faced by House members regarding committee inftu-
ence on the conference procedure, as the committee median was known to 
be different than the floor median. The debate over minimum wage legis-
lation centered on several policy issues: 1) the level of the basic minimum 
wage, 2) the extent of coverage under this wage (groups whose exclusion was 
debated included agricultural workers, tip workers, and workers for small 
businesses), and 3) the question of a separate 'sub-minimum' youth wage. 
One can collapse the first two of these issues onto a single dimension: the 
liberalness of the minimum wage law. The youth wage does not fit quite so 
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well on this dimension. However, it can be isolated in both debate and roll 
call votes from other elements of the minimum wage. Thus it is possible 
to treat much of the debate during the 1970s as one over-liberalizing the 
status quo that existed as a resul~ of the 1966 amendment to the fair labor 
standards act of 1938: a minimum wage of $1.60 with exemptions for certain 
groups of workers and no sub-minimum youth wage. 
Four groups will be considered in this analysis: the House, the Senate, 
the House Education and Labor Committee (which had jurisdiction over 
minimum wage legislation) and the conference committee that reconciled 
the two chambers' bills. In 1960 the conference committee considering min-
imum wage legislation was unable to reach agreement on a compromise bill 
between the two chambers. Throughout the 1970s debate, it was understood 
that the Senate bill would be more liberal than the House bill, and that it was 
up to the conferees to fashion a compromise acceptable to both chambers. 
Also, the Education and Labor committee had a history of writing bills that 
members of the House found unacceptable (Fenno, 1973). Yet, until 1977 
there was no doubt that members of the Education and Labor Committee 
would represent the House in conference. 13 
The relative median ideal points of three of these groups can be sum-
marized as follows. The House had a median higher than the status quo, 
and the House Education and Labor Committee and the Senate both had 
medians higher than the House median. It appears that the Senate median 
was higher than the Education and Labor Committee median. (Figure 7) 
By examining Figure 7 in light of the theory presented earlier one would 
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expect the Education and Labor Committee to attempt to offer a proposal 
somewhere in betwe~n H and C, and force the House to accept it through 
the conference committee procedure. The problem members of the House 
faced was to try and enforce their lower median point against this strategy 
by the Education and Labor Committee. 
[Figure Seven] 
In 1972, the Education and Labor Committee reported a bill raising 
the minimum wage for most non-agricultural workers from $1.60 an hour 
to $2.00 an hour and extending coverage under the minimum wage law 
to an additional six million previously uncovered workers. However, the 
House considered this bill under a rule that allowed an amendment in the 
nature of a substitute by Erlenborn (R - Ill). Erlenborn, a Republican on 
the Education and Labor Committee, was more conservative than the me-
dian committee member. His substitute amendment diluted the committee's 
proposal. Erlenborn's bill would have spread the wage increase over two 
years and omitted the provision extending coverage. [Note: all proposals 
considered would have raised the minimum wage from the status quo. A 
"diluting" provision refers to one which would have raised the minimum 
wage less than the bill being considered.] In May the House passed Eden-
born's substitute by a vote of 217 to 191, and passed the bill as amended by 
a vote of 330 to 78. 
In July the Senate passed a bill similar to the Education and Labor 
Committee's original proposal. Conservative members of the House pos-
tulated that, if a conference committee made up of House Education and 
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Labor members and liberal Senators met, the result would be a conference 
report resembling the liberal Senate bill. Erlenborn complained that: 
All too often . . . the House speaks its will by amending legis-
lation from (the Education and Labor Committee) or adopting 
substitute bills and sending the legislation to the other body. All 
too often the other body passes a bill very similar to that rejected 
by the House. And almost without exception the conference 
committee members appointed by the House accede more to the 
provisions of the other body than they try to protect the pro-
visions which the House had adopted. (CQ Almanac, 1972, p 
370) 
Rather than face the prospect of having to vote against a conference 
report on the minimum wage which they found less preferable than the 
status quo, members of the House defeated the motion to go to conference 
190-198 in August. The motion to go to conference was brought up again 
in October and was defeated 188-196. 
After a series of votes on the floor - - roll call votes were taken on 
three floor amendments changing the level of the wage or the extent of 
coverage - - the members of the Education and Labor Committee should 
have been able to estimate the House median. With this estimate they should 
have been able to determine how high a proposal the conference committee 
could make and still be closer to the House median than the status quo was. 
They would have known that if they reported a bill out higher than SPc it 
would have been rejected (Figure 7). There was no reason for members of 
the House not to think that members of the Education and Labor Committee 
would behave rationally and produce a proposal preferable to the status quo. 
The result of the House action was that both the House and the Edu-
cation and Labor Committee were left with an outcome - - the status quo 
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- - which majorities in both felt was not as desirable as available feasible 
outcomes. However, given the ongoing nature of the minimum wage de-
bate it would have been rational for the members of the House to pursue 
a long-term (i.e., repeated game) strategy and refuse to give Education and 
Labor the opportunity to introduce a conference report, hoping to force the 
committee to more accurately represent the House viewpoint in conference 
in following years. 
After failing to pass legislation in 1972, the House again took up min-
imum wage legislation in 1973. Erlenborn again offered an amendment in 
the nature of a substitute that would have diluted the bill reported by the 
Education and Labor Committee. Erlenborn 's substitute was almost identi-
cal to his 1972 substitute that had passed by a vote of 217 to 191 when first 
offered. However, there was apparently a change in the median ideal point 
in the House. This time the amendment failed on the floor 199-218 and the 
House passed HR 7935, in virtually the same form it had emerged from the 
Education and Labor committee, by a vote of 287-130 . 
. 
Members of the Education and Labor Committee then went to confer-
ence and came back with a bill extending coverage to an additional 700,000 
retail and service workers. This bill was presumably further from the House 
median· than HR7935 was, but still closer to the House median than the 
status quo was, for it passed 253-152. There are two hypotheses that are 
impossible to distinguish between in this case. Hypothesis one is that the 
House conferees willingly adjusted the bill in conference to make it conform 
more with the original Education and Labor Committee bill. Hypothesis 
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two is that the House conferees attempted to uphold the House position but 
were forced to compromise with Senate conferees, who genuinely preferred 
. a bill that was more like the Education and Labor Committee bill. Dent 
(D - Pa), a Democratic member of the Education and Labor Committee, 
defended the conferees' actions, claiming that the House conferees receded 
13 times on "key measures" while the Senate conferees receded 29 times 
(Congressional Record, August 3, 1973; p 28111). Erlenborn had his own 
interpretation: "What happened in the conference? There was no discus-
sion . . . They (the House conferees) immediately proceeded to accede 
to the Senate position and follow what was clearly thrown out twice by the 
House." (Congressional Record, August 3, 1973; p 28116) 
Thus, despite the implicit warning in 1972, the Education and Labor 
Committee was still able to utilize the conference committee to obtain a bill 
that would not have passed the House under an open rule. And the House 
was forced to accept a bill that was further from its median than the bill it 
had originally passed before going to conference. Whether this would have 
happened with a different set of conferees is not possible to determine. 
After this exercise of the Education and Labor committee's final pro-
poser power the House changed the rule regarding appointment of conferees. 
Whereas previously the conferees were always committee members, the new 
rule specified that conferees would be members "who generally supported 
the House position as determined by the Speaker." The Education and La-
bor committee Republicans led by Erlenborn expected to benefit from this 
change. They knew that as a group their median (ELR) was closer to the 
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House median than was the Education and Labor committee median. Con-
sidering the relative medians for the minimum wage for 1973 it is easy to 
" 
see why these hopes seemed justified (Figure 8). 
[Figure Eight] 
Figure 8 illustrates the expected result of this rule change. Under-the 
oJd rules this case would have been analogous to Figure 7: and one would 
expect the Education and Labor conferees to exercise their final proposer 
power and report SPc from conference committee. If the members of the 
House were acting rationally this would be the outcome as it is preferred to 
the status quo. However, under the new rule presumably the House mem-
bers participating in the conference committee would support the House 
median. Thus H is the expected result, and it is preferred by a majority of 
the Republicans on Education and Labor to SP, . 
Minimum wage legislation was again considered in 1977 under the new 
rule governing the appointment of conferees, and the Education and Labor 
Republicans were much more successful than they were in 1973 in diluting 
the committee proposal (HR3744) on the floor. Three key amendments were 
passed, two of which were proposed by Republicans members of the Educa-
tion and Labor committee. First, an amendment was offered by Erlenborn 
to remove a provision of the committee bill indexing the minimum wage 
to the CPl. This diluted the bill on the magnitude of benefits. Second, an 
amendment by was offered by Quie (R - Mn), a Republican member of Ed-
ucation and Labor, to delete provisions regarding the tip-credif. This would 
also have diluted the bill on the extent of coverage, as the tip-credit was a 
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way of not paying the full minimum wage to workers receiving tips. And 
third, an amendment was offered by Pickle (D-Tx) to exempt small busi-
nesses with gross sales of less than $500,000.00, rather than small businesses 
with gross sales of less than $250,000.00 as HR3744 proposed. This diluted 
the bill on the extent of coverage, as fewer workers would be covered under 
· Pickle's amendment. 
The rules of the House specified that the Speaker would appoint the 
conferees. However, the standard practice was that the Chair of the com-
mittee that proposed the legislation being sent to conference would submit 
a slate of proposed conferees to the Speaker, and the Speaker would then 
announce appointment of these conferees immediately upon passage of the 
motion to go to conference. In October of 1977 Perkins (D - Ky), the Chair 
of Education and Labor, proposed 10 conferees (plus Pickle as an additional 
conferee only for consideration of his own amendment) to the Speaker, Carl 
Albert (D - Ok). Education and Labor Republicans were s·urprised to find 
that the conferees that were proposed by Perkins had voted 2-8, 4-7, and 
4-6 against the three key amendments which had passed during House floor 
consideration. 
When Perkins asked for unanimous consent to go to conference Er-
lenborn reserved the right to object, pointing out that "the conferees as so 
named (Perkins' list) will not comply with section 701 of House Rules." 
Perkins replied that a majority of the proposed conferees had in fact voted 
for final passage of the bill (see Table I). Erlenborn noted in his retort that 
rule 701 was adopted as a result of a similar dispute he had had with Perkins 
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TABLE III· 1 
Roll Call Votes in the House on 1977 Minimum Wage Legislation 
Table 
Erlenborn Quie Pickle Motion 
Amend- Amend- Amend- House to go Con f. 
ment ment ment Bill to Conf. Report 
House 223-193 264-161 221-183 309-96 138-266 236-187 
REPs 126-15 132-11 127-10 61-76 118-20 17-124 
DEMs 97-178 132-150 94-173 248-20 20-246 219-63 
Confs 2-8 4-6 4-7 9-1 3-7 8-3 
Committee 10-25 16-19 13-23 30-5 9-31 32-9 
Comm REPs 9-2 12-0 12-0 7-5 9-2 3-8 
Comm DEMs 1-23 4-19 1-23 23-0 0-22 23-1 
in 1973 during consideration of the minimum wage bill. Erlenborn pointed 
out that after he objected to the 1972 minimum wage bill "the House refused 
to send (the bill) to conference when it was obvious that the conferees were 
not going to uphold the position of the House." 
Erlenborn offered a motion to table the motion to go to conference in 
anticipation of the Perkins' conferees being approved ." This motion failed 
138-266, with the House Republicans supporting it 118-20 and Democrats 
opposing it 20-246 (Table I) . The motion to go to conference then passed (91-
41) and the Speaker announced appointment of Perkins' proposed conferees. 
Erlenborn made a point of order "against the naming of the conferees as 
not being in compliance with the provisions of section 701(e), rule X of the 
House." The Speaker-- an appointee of the Democratic party-- overruled 
the point of order. (Congressional Record; Oct. 12, 1977; p 33432-33435.) 
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This ruling by the Speaker is consistent with the theory presented ear-
lier. Since a majority of Democrats voted against each of the amendments 
passed in the House it can be inferred that a majority of Democrats preferred 
the committee bill to the bill that passed the House. Hence the Speaker 
acting as an agent of the Demo~ratic party should have allowed the com-
mittee to represent the House in conference. The Speaker could expect the 
committee to attempt to offer a conference report closer to the committee 
proposal, that in this case was closer to the Democratic median. If the com-
mittee proposal was not closer to the Democratic median than the House 
bill was then there would have been no reason for the Speaker to approve 
Perkins' proposed conferees. 
In conference, the House conferees were able to produce a proposal 
closer to the original committee proposal than the House passed bill by ac-
cepting substantial portions of the more liberal Senate bill. They accepted 
the higher base minimum wage that had passed the Senate, thus achieving 
virtually the same effect that indexing would have achieved. (Erlenborn 's 
floor amendment had stripped the committee's original indexing provisions.) 
They accepted a stronger tip-credit provision (i.e., accepted a tip-credit pro-
vision closer to that which passed the committee, despite the House having 
decisively rejected the committee position in passing_Quie's amendment on 
the floor). And they re-adjusted the minimum size for coverage from busi-
nesses of $500,000 to businesses of $362,500 in gross sales, thus insuring that 
more workers would be covered by the minimum wage. (The Education 
and Labor committee h'ad originally passed a bill allowing for a $250,000 
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level; the Pickle amendment had changed it to $500,000 during House floor 
consideration.) 
[Figure Nine] 
House conservatives tried to resubmit the measure to conference com-
mittee, but this motion was defeated. The conference report was ultimately 
accepted on October 20, by a vote of 236-187 (Congressional Quarterly; 
October 22, 1977, p. 2247-2248). 
Conclusion 
This paper has illustrated several features of the conference committee 
procedure. The case provided offers anecdotal evidence that: a) the basics 
of ex-post veto theory are rooted in fact , b) members perceive the potential 
of an ex-post veto as a problem, and c) despite rule X, clause 6(f), the spirit of 
the rule is violated in a way consistent with the model of Speaker decision-
making that I have proposed. The basic theory of the ex-post veto requires 
some modification from the Shepsle-Weingast version to make it fit the rules 
of the House. Once those modifications are made, and the agenda-setting 
power of the conferees as well as the appointment power of the Speaker 
are considered, then it can be seen that the conference does indeed convey 
influence to the conferees. However, there is reason to believe that the 
conferees do not always represent the standing committee. Rather they may 
represent only what is acceptable to a majority of the majority party on the 
floor. Distinguishing between these competing hypothesis requires a more 
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1) All provisions take effect in 1978 unless otherwise specified. 
2) The level of tip-credit is the credit allowed to employers. Hence 
a credit of only 20% allows an employer to pay $1.60 to an em-
ployee when the minimum wage is $2.00. 
Theory and Estimation 
In this chapter I develop and estimate the specific models to test the ef-
fects of the conference procedure on committee influence within the House. 
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I also test to see if conferees represent the committee, the chamber, or the 
majority party. This chapter is organized as follows. First there is a brief dis-
cussion of the general approach taken and its application to the conference 
procedure. This includes a discussion of the different types of interactions 
between groups within Congress-- committees and parent chambers--
that will be considered. Following this, the relationship of the committee 
to its parent chamber is further developed. Next, I consider the conference 
report itself, and then backtrack to consider what the strategies described 
imply for the selection of conferees. I then summarize the hypotheses gen-
erated, and offer a discussion of the overall model developed. Finally, the 
remainder of the paper describes the methodology and data used to actually 
test the hypotheses developed. 
The common spatial model of a legislature as developed by Shepsle 
is again adopted (Shepsle, 1979). A legislature consisting of L members is 
considered. Outcomes or policies are treated as points in an N -dimensional 
Euclidean space. Each legislator is assumed to have preferences over these 
points. The institution contains a set of rules that partitions the legislature 
into committees. Each committee has jurisdiction over some subset of the 
policy space. I will assume that the intersection between any two commit-
tees ' jurisdictions is empty. I will further assume that each item for which 
there is any appropriation corresponds to a unique, single dimension within 
the policy space; and that the appropriations committee is the sole com-
mittee with jurisdiction over appropriations. Each legislator i is assumed to 
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have an ideal point aii in each jth dimension, and each legislator has pref-
erences that are separable over the dimensions. Thus given two points in 
a single dimension j, legislator i prefers the . point that is closer to 8;1 . A 
committee or chamber median is the median ideal point of the members 
of the committee or chamber. Unless stated otherwise, it is assumed that a 
committee is a single actor whose ideal point is the committee median," and 
hence that "a committee" has preferences and has a single strategy. 
Strategic Problems 
The method of reconciling House-Senate differences suggests a 
principal-agent problem where each parent chamber is a principal, and each 
Appropriations committee is assumed to be an agent of its parent chamber. 
(Both the committee and the parent chamber are treated as unitary actors 
represented by a single median preference until the criteria for conferee 
selection is examined.) The Appropriations committees are assumed to 
act strategically. Each committee's ultimate goal is to produce a conference 
report that is as close as possible to its median, and that will also be ap-
proved by both parent chambers. Each chamber's ultimate goal is to force 
the conferees to produce a conference report that is as close as possible 
to the chamber's median, and that will also be approved by the opposing 
chamber. 
Note that each committee must deal directly with two bodies: its par-
ent chamber, and its opposite committee. (The term "opposite committee" 
refers to the committee of the other chamber with the same jurisdiction, 
the House Appropriations committee's "opposite committee" would be the 
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Senate Appropriations committee.) Similarly, each parent chamber must 
deal directly with two bodies: its committee, and the opposite chamber. 
Committee-committee interaction is considered first. 
The Two-Player Game 
The committees' proposals to the floor may be strategic attempts to in-
fluence the opposing committee, rather than attempts to influence the parent 
chamber. In this section I assume that the standing committees are chosen to 
represent their parent chambers in conference. Thus I view the conference 
committee procedure as a two-player bargaining game between committees: 
each committee acts to maximize its own objective function. The purpose 
of this section is simply to describe the problems legislators in such a two-
player game face: whether the two players are a committee and its parent 
chamber, two committees, or two chambers. Assuming Euclidean prefer-
ences, and treating the committee as a unitary actor, this simply means that 
· the committee seeks a bill as close to its median as possible. However, both 
committees are constrained not only by the conferees from the opposing 
committee, but by their own principals: their respective parent chambers. 
It would be useless for the committees to return to their parent chambers 
with bills that the chambers would not approve (barring the case where 
the committee prefers the status quo to anything that is acceptable to the 
parent chamber). Hence in conference each committee must consider the 
preferences of the members of its parent chamber. 
The solution to a two-player bargaining game --whether it is between 
the two committees, between a committee and its parent chamber, or be-
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tween the two chambers-- is not uniquely determined. We only know that 
it will lie somewhere on the contract curve between the two players. The 
contract curve is the locus of points which are pareto-optimal, a move off the 
contract curve could not make both committees better off. In the unidimen-
sional case the contract curve is simply the line between the medians of the 
two players (Varian, 1978). Thus even if we know both players' preferences 
we would not be able to predict the resulting conference report. However, 
there are different bargaining solutions available which predict the results of 
such a two-player game. I will present the Nash solution as a model of the 
game between two actors dealing with a bill. The two players for which the 
argument is presented are the two committees; but the description applies 
as well to the interaction between a committee and its parent or between 
the two chambers. 
Imagine that each committee comes to conference with bundles of 
goods. They goods they possess are their proposals for spending. The Nash 
solution satisfies two crucial assumptions. First, it is pareto-optimal; there 
is no other solution available that would make both parties better off. And 
second, it is symmetric with respect to the two actors; if the preferences of 
the two players are reversed then the outcome would not change. In the case 
of two committees bargaining in conference the Nash solution is equivalent 
to a "split-the-difference" solution: it predicts the midpoint between the 
committees' positions (Luce and Raiffa, 1957). 
If each committee assumes that a "split-the-difference" approach will 
be used, then each committee will wish to misrepresent its preferences to 
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assure that the average of its reported choice and its opponent's reported 
choice equals its true median. [Note that the difference being split is the 
difference between the two committee reports, not the difference between 
the two bills passed by the full chambers!] If a committee believes that the 
opposing committee's median is higher than its own, then it will report a 
number lower than its median. If it believes that the opposing chamber's 
median is lower than its own, then it will report a number higher than 
its own median. I assume that each committee can estimate the opposing 
committee's median in some manner without relying on the report of the 
opposing committee. This estimate would be based on any information 
available to the committee. One would expect it to be heavily influenced by 
its previous dealings with the members of the opposite committee. However, 
these dealings could be augmented by knowledge of the types of constituents 
represented by members of the opposite committee, and macro-economic 
variables. The key is that the committee relies upon its estimate of the 
opposing committee's median, rather than upon the figure reported by the 
opposing committee. (Though the Senate committee might use the House 
committee's report in making its estimate of the House committee's median. 
This option is not open to the House committee, as it always reports its figure 
before the Senate committee acts.) 
Without political constraints added, no matter how each committee 
determines its opposite's median, it is difficult to generate any signaling 
equilibria that do not degenerate if "split-the-difference" is assumed. If 
each committee believes that "split-the-difference" will be the norm, then 
.. 
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over time such strategies could degenerate to one committee reporting zero, 
and the other committee reporting twice its true median. [Nofe: all variables 
with a - (tilde) denote an amount proposed; variables with an • (asterisk) 
denote true preferences. sc denotes the Senate Appropriations committee, 
HC the House Appropriations committee, s the Senate, H the House, CF 
the conferees, and H M the majority party within the House.] Assume the 
House committee desires a higher appropriation than the Senate committee, 
i.e. , He· > sc· . Assume that in year t the result of the conference is CRt, 
where sc; < CRt = (HCt + SCt)/ 2 < He; . Then since the conference report 
was less than the House median, in the following year, all other things being 
equal, the House committee will report more than it did the previous year, 
i.e., HCt+t > HCt and the Senate committee will report less than it did the 
previous year, i.e., sct+t > SGt. So again, sc;+1 < CRt+t = (HCt+t + SCt+t) / 2 < 
Hc;+t. This process would continue until some period T where seT= o and 
HCT = 2HC" . 
However, the reader will undoubtedly realize that such a scenario is 
implausible in the political context of these models for several reasons. Indi-
vidual legislators are constrained for position-taking reasons from ever vot-
ing for appropriations that are too far from their constituents' preferences, 
and committees are constrained for institutional reasons (responsibility to 
the chamber, maintaining the myth of expertise, etc.) from ever reporting 
appropriations that a majority of the chamber would find to be irresponsibly 
high or low (Mayhew, 1974, Fenno, 1973). 
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This constraint can be incorporated in a legislator's utility function. In 
the standard spatial model a legislator's preferences are defined solely across 
outcomes . . For instance, given the assumption of Euclidean preferences, 
legislator i with ideal point 8i would have utility function ui(x) = -(x- 8i) 2 , 
where x is the final amount appropriated. However, taking into account a 
legislator' s interest in position taking, a more realistic utility function is given 
i initially proposes, -y1 and -y2 are positive constants, and c.; is the median 
ideal point of the legislator' s constituents. In this model the legislator's 
utility is determined not only by how close the result is to his/her ideal 
point, but also by how close a proposal he/she makes to his/her median 
constituent's ideal point. For simplicity's sake I will assume that c.; = ei, 
or that the legislator perfectly represents his/her median constituent' s ideal 
point. Hence the utility function can be rewritten as Ui (x, pi) = - -y1 (x - Bi) 2 -
The legislator will seek to maximize utility by choosing Pi to maximize 
vi. In the case where vi = - (x - 8i)2 , the legislator attempts to maximize vi 
by influencing x: the outcome. In the split-the-difference model, x = P1 + P2, 
where p 1 is the amount reported by the first committee, and p 2 is the amount 
reported by the second committee. Solving for x: vi = -( ~ (p1 + P2) - 8i)2 • 
Replacing the legislator with an anthropomorphic committee which acts as 
a legislator with ideal point ei, the ith committee now maximizes utility by 
choosing Pi · Differentiating: 
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Solving the first order condition yields 
or 
and 
Thus it is possible to generate partial equilibria solutions Pi and P2· However, 
when the general equilibrium is considered this leads to a perverse result. 
The two partial equilibria do not yield a unique solution. 
Utilizing the utility function that includes position-taking considera-
tions alleviates this problem, as this utility function does yield a general 
equilibrium solution. Consider the utility maximization problem faced by 
the anthropomorphic committee i with position-taking considerations (note: 
1'1 and 1'2 are assumed to be the same for both committees): 
where 
Differentiating and solving the first order condition: 
But solving similarly for p1, and substituting yields 
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and 
Note that when -y2 = o , Pi and P2 are undefined. Also note that when x1 is 
large, so is P1; and that as x 2 goes up (and hence Pi), Pi goes down. Looking at 
the equilibrium equations for Pi and p;, if -y2 is small, then Pi and Pi could be 
negative. However, as the House and Senate Appropriations committees are 
never observed reporting negative appropriations, the apparent conclusion 
is that -y2 is not small. 
The purpose of this exercise is to show that when position-taking con-
siderations are considered, there is some equilibrium determined. While the 
parameters of the utility function described above cannot be estimated,- it is 
important that the model implies that there is an equilibrium position that 
we can expect the conference report to represent. Thus, modeling the con-
ference procedure is possible. The predictions of committee reports can be 
grounded in utility maximization, and still not be degenerate predictions of 
0 and twice the higher committee's true median. While a committee (or an 
entire chamber) may report a bill designed to maximize its utility, it does so 
subject to constraints imposed on individual members by constituents, and 
imposed on the committee by the institution. 
Institutional Details of the Conference Procedure 
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The Constitution of the U .S. requires a bill to be passed in identical 
form by both the House of Representatives and the Senate before it can 
become law. Since bills may be amended and modified along their route 
to passage, even two bills starting out as perfect duplicates of each other in 
committee are unlikely to remain identical after enactment by each chamber. 
Thus a method of resolving these differences after action by each chamber is 
needed. Two such methods exist: amendments between the chambers and 
conference committees (Bach, 1984). 
If one chamber passes a bill, and the second chamber passes it with 
amendments then the first chamber has the option of agreeing to the second 
chamber's amendments. Alternatively, the first chamber can offer amend-
ments to the second chamber's bill. The key aspect of this process is that it 
involves no committee action, the amendments are passed by the full body 
of each chamber. 
It is generally believed that the conference committee process is used 
when the differences between the two chambers are too complicated to settle 
with a few amendments. Here there would be substantial differences in 
the texts of the bills passed by each chamber. Each chamber has its own 
procedures for choosing conferees. In the House they are appointed by the 
Speaker immediately after the decision by the House to go to conference. 
Normally the Speaker approves a slate of conferees proposed by the chair of 
the committee that had jurisdiction over the legislation. However, the rules 
of the House specify that the Speaker must appoint "no less than a majority 
of members who generally supported the House position as determined by 
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the Speaker." Senate conferees may actually be elected; however, the usual 
procedure is the equivalent of the House procedure in that the presiding 
officer is given authority to appoint conferees (Bach, 1984). 
The conferees may receive instructions from their respective chambers. 
However, such instructions are not binding. _  What is a binding constraint on 
the conferees is that they may not produce a conference report that is outside 
the bounds of both the Senate and House bill. In order to reach agreement 
majorities of the conferees from both chambers must approve the conference 
report. 
Before the 1970s conference committee meetings were generally 
closed. However, they are now open unless otherwise agreed to in an open 
vote by the conferees. In fact House conferees cannot vote for a closed 
conference without a roll call vote by the entire House. Majorities of both 
chambers must actually sign the conference report, as well as the explanatory 
statement each chamber requires. 
Institutional Details of Appropriations Legislation 
To understand the conference report it is best to back up one step and 
consider the form of the bills that precede it. The first bill that appears is 
the bill that is reported by the Appropriations committee in the House. This 
bill may then be amended on the floor of the House, and is passed before 
the Senate acts. In the Senate a bill is reported by the Senate Appropri-
ations committee, and may then be amended on the floor . After this bill 
is amended, the Senate bill is incorporated into the version that passed the 
House floor by amendments to the' House bill. In other words, the Senate 
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considers the House bill, proposes its own version as a substitute, and passes 
HRxxxx with the new content. The conference committee then considers the 
two versions of House bill HRxxxx, with the changes to the House version 
denoted by numbered amendments. 
The conferees have three options on items where the two chambers 
have appropriated different amounts. Such a situation would occur if the 
House suggests an amount, and the Senate passes amendment number y 
appropriating a different amount. The conferees can recommend that the 
House amount be accepted, that the Senate amount be accepted, or that 
some amount in between be accepted. In the first case they would suggest 
that "the Senate recede from its amendment numbered y," in the second 
case they would suggest that the House recede from its disagreement to 
Senate amendment numberred y." If the conferees choose to recommend 
an amount in between, then they would suggest that the House "recede 
from its disagreement to amendment numbered y and agree to the same 
with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed .... " These 
recommendations may constitute the entire conference report. And when 
each chamber votes to adopt the conference report it is these suggestions 
that they are adopting. 
A different thing occurs if the Senate proposes an appropriation m 
an area where the House has not proposed a number. Since the only pur-
pose of the conference report is to settle matters where both chambers have 
legislated and are in dispute, they report such amendments as being in "tech-
nical disagreement" and they are handled outside the conference report. In 
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practice these amendments are dealt with in the managers statement ac-
companying the conference report. The managers statement will contain 
a suggestion for each numbered amendment in technical disagreement that 
"the managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and 
concur in the Senate amendment with an amendment as follows: in lieu of 
" 
What distinguishes these amendments in technical disagreement is that 
they are voted on separately (and in fact they need not be voted on at all 
if the managers of the House do not so move). However, if any of these 
amendments fail, then the conference report fails. 
Committee-Parent Chamber Interaction 
Since the parent chamber is free to amend the committee' s bill on the 
floor, it is not apparent that the committee's initial proposal should affect 
the final bill. Elementary application of Black's theorem suggests that the 
first proposal should have no effect on the final outcome of a bill in a single 
dimension, as the median is a Condorcet winner (Black, 1958). However, 
to suggest that the committee's report is irrelevant would be an extreme as-
sertion. This conjecture is only even theoretically plausible if we are firmly 
anchored in one dimension. Even in one dimension this conjecture is at 
odds with popular notions of deference to committees based on committee 
expertise, and theories of cooperation (Fenno, 1973, Axelrod, 1981). Hence 
I will return to the effect of the committees' preferences and the commit-
tees' reports on the chambers' bill later for a more detailed look at these 
considerations. 
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In the above analysis there is no interaction between the committee 
and its parent chamber, other than the intuition that the parent chamber 
constrains the committee from reporting outlandish appropriations. There is 
nothing in the model postulated to suggest that the committee report, or the 
committee median, would have any effect on the parent chamber's position. 
However, the model allows for a test of this timeless truth of political science 
lore: that chambers defer to committees. 
Arguments that chambers defer to committees because of committees' 
"expertise," or because of larger considerations of cooperation, abound in 
the Congress literature. This has remained a stylized fact since Woodrow 
Wilson's day (Wilson, 1885). However, such deference has never been docu-
mented. The closed rules granted to Ways and Means Committee legislation 
was considered to be the archetypal example of deference to committees. 
Fenno argued that legislators deferred to Wilbur Mills' committee's exper-
tise on tax legislation (Fenno, 1973). However, it is possible that Mills was 
really reporting what the House wanted his committee to report. We cannot 
say that a chamber is deferring to a committee unless we can say that the 
chamber has passed a bill that is not the chamber's median, and that the 
committee prefers the bill to the chamber' s median. By utilizing a model 
that includes the chamber's median and the committee's median I am able 
to determine whether or not such deference occurs. Specifically, I will test 
the following hypothesis: a chamber will appropriate more (less) than its 
true median if the median of the appropriating committee within the cham-
ber is higher (lower) than the chamber's median, and the strategic situation 
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vis-a-vis the opposing chamber is in the committee's favor (Hl). The strate-
gic situation is determined by the ordering of the medians of: the House, the 
House Appropriations Committee, and the Senate. The committee is said 
to be in a favorable situation if the Senate median is on the same side of 
the House median as the committee median. In other words, the situation 
is favorable to the committee if: He· > H " and s· > H '; or He· < H " and 
s· < H". Or, HC" E [S", H "]. 
Conferee Selection 
I will also test the theory of strategic conferee selection (Nagler, 1986). 
Specifically, I will test the hypothesis that since 1973 and the passage of 
Rule X, clause 6(f) -- the rule specifying that a majority of conferees must 
be "members who generally supported the House position as determined 
by the Speaker" - - conferees have been chosen who were acceptable to 
a majority within the majority party in the House. To operationalize this, 
I test whether the conferees' median will be closer to the median of the 
majority party or to the median of the entire chamber (H2). There are two 
competing hypotheses: that conferees are chosen who are acceptable to a 
majority of the entire House, or that Rule X is ignored and conferees are 
chosen irrespective of the preferences of the members of the House. I believe 
that Rule X, clause 6(f) was passed because the preferences of members of 
the House were previously ignored in the selection of conferees 
Restatement of Hypotheses 
The hypotheses described above can now be restated as follows: 
.. 
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Hl) A chamber will pass a bill appropriating more (less) than its 
true median if the median of the appropriating committee 
within the chamber is higher (lower) than the chamber's 
median; and the strategic situation vis-a-vis the opposing 
chamber is in the committee's favor. 
H2) The conferees' median will be closer to the median of the 
majority party than to the median of the entire chamber. 
Model Specification 
Hl: Effect of the Committee on the Chamber 
It is possible to test the effects of the appropriations committees within 
their respective chambers with the above methodology. The following equa-




X IS a set of independent variables expected to influence the 
reported House figure 
61 = { 
1
• 0, 
82 = { 1• 0, 
if the committee has a strategic advantage; 
otherwise. 
if the floor has a strategic advantage in conference; 
otherwise. 
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The expectation is that {32 will be positive, indicating that the committee 
has an influence on the floor's report whe.n the committee has a strategic 
advantage in conference (i.e., when the Senate is in agreement with the 
committee relative to the entire House). And the expectation is that {33 will 
not be significant, as the presumption is that committee influence will only 
exist when it is bestowed upon the committee via a favorable situation in 
conference. The independent variables expected to influence ii are: the 
amount the president requests, the unemployment rate, the inflation rate, 
the percentage of Democrats in the House, and a dummy for whether it is 
an election year. These variables are similar to those shown by Kiewiet and 
McCubbins to affect annual appropriations decisions by Congress (Kiewiet 
and McCubbins, 1985a). The basic premise is that while Congress is guided 
by the President's request, it also acts countercyclically: increasing appro-
priations in times of high unemployment, and decreasing appropriations in 
times of high inflation. In addition Kiewiet and McCubbins showed that a 
greater number of Democrats in Congress results in higher appropriations, 
reflecting the different beliefs in the two major parties on the role and size 
of government. Finally it is believed that Congress will want to increase 
spending in election years for whatever electoral advantage may be had. 
Some other variables might a priori be expected to be influential here: most 
notably the size of the federal deficit. Surprisingly, it was not a significant 
determinant of appropriations over the period studied. 
H2: Conferee Selection 
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I have claimed that rule X in the House has allowed the Speaker to 
appoint conferees who will be favorably viewed by a majority of the majority 
party within the House, rather than the entire chamber. The implication of 
this is that the conferees' median will be closer to the median of the majority 
party than to the median of the entire chamber; i.e., (HD"-CF") 2 < (H"-CF") 2 , 
where H D is the median of the members of the majority party in the House, 
or the House Democrats for the period examined. Furthermore, if this is a 
motivating factor in the appointment of conferees, then we should see some 
movement on the part of the conferees from the committee median towards 
the median of the majority party in the House. In other words, the conferees 
median should be bounded by the committee median and the median of the 
majority party in the House; or, CF" E (HD" ,HC" ). 
Having established two hypotheses so far I now turn to a discussion of 
the methodology and data available to test them with. 
Methodology 
To test the hypotheses described above it is necessary to know the true 
preferences of members, or at least the median ideal point of the committee 
and parent chamber. The random-utility model model utilized by Krehbiel 
and Rivers (1989) provides a method for estimating individual legislator' s 
ideal points provided that: 1) the legislator's sincere preference between two 
outcomes on a bill is available, and 2) a set of exogenous variables that can 
be used as predictors of each legislator's preferences on the bill is available. 
The only assumption about legislators' utility functions needed is that . 
they be euclidean. For legislator i at time t with ideal point eit, 
... 
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·No further assumptions about the form of the utility function are necessary. 
Now assume that each legislator has an ideal point ()it given by: 
eql 
where 
• Ait = [Xt iZi t] , 
• Xt is a vector of macro--economic variables , 
• Zit is a vector of the ith legislator's characteristics. 
Further, assume 
• J.Lit ~ IN(O, cr2 ) • 
Define slt to be the state of the world where more money is spent 
depending upon the fate of bill s appropriating Y dollars. And define sOt 
to be the state of the world where less money is spent depending upon the 
fate of bill s . In other words, if bill s is higher than the status quo (or, 
technically, the reversion point) then slt corresponds to the passage of s, if 
s is lower than the reversion .point, then slt corresponds to the failure of 
the bill. In practice, it is almost uniformly the case that stt corresponds to 
passage. Now legislator i will vote for result sot (i.e., generally, vote no) if 
80 
Based on the euclidean utility function defined, this is equivalent to saying 
that legislator i will vote for result sot if 
Thus the probability that the ith legislator votes against bill s is given by 
However, substituting eql , this is equivalent to 
Pr[ao + A~t,B + J.Lit < ~(sot+ slt)]. 
Rearranging terms gives 
Pr[J.L;t < ao + ~(sot + slt)- A~t,B ] . 
But by the assumption of the distribution of errors this can be expressed as 
or 
where 
- a a =--
u 
- ,8 






Estimates of a, ~!, and {32 can now be obtained via probit. What is needed 
are estimates of a, and (3, the coefficients of the equation that determines the 
' 





Q = -(TQ = --=-
(31 
- ~2 
(3 = -u-(32 = --::--. 
(31 
Estimates of the variance of the computed coefficients can also be computed. 
Define f3i as follows: 
Then 
~2i 
{3; = ----. 
(31 
1 
Var(f3)=-=- Var(~2 ) + 
!3? 
1 - - -
- -=- c ov ((32, (31) 2(3~ 
f3f 
where f3i is the it"- element of (3, or the ith coefficient. and 
V ar ( Oi) = Ait' V ar ((3)Ait 
Application of the Random-Utility Model 
In order to estimate the above model sincere revelations of members' 
preferences between two states of the world represented by the passage or 
defeat of a bill (s1 vs. so), and a set of exogenous variables (A) that can be 
used to predict those preferences, must be available. Roll call votes will 
be used to provide the revelations of preference between two outcomes. 
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Demographic and socio-economic data available from the decennial census 
by congressional district provide variables that can be used as predictors of 
legislators' preferences. 
In order for roll-call votes to be sincere it is generally required that 
they be on the final stage of a bill. Votes on prior amendments may be 
strategic attempts to influence the probability of the bill's final passage, or 
attempts to send signals to other legislators. However, the strategic-conferee 
theory presented above suggests that we cannot rule out such strategic action 
on bills even on final passage before going to conference. The vote on the 
final passage of a bill before going to conference may represent an attempt 
by the chamber to achieve a bargaining position in conference vis-a-vis the 
opposing chamber. Hence rather than use the final vote on the bill before 
going to conference, I will use roll call votes on the conference reports 
themselves. Such votes are as close as one can come to the absolute last 
move of the game on a piece of legislation. 
The analysis will utilize appropriations for selected federal agencies 
for the period 1973 through 1980 (fiscal year 1974 through fiscal year 1981). 
Kiewiet and McCubbins have collected data on the amounts actually ap-
propriated, the amounts proposed by both Appropriations committees, the 
amounts passed by each chamber, and the amounts requested by the pres-
ident for these federal agencies (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1985a). Funding 
for these agencies is contained in the 13 yearly appropriations bills that both 
Appropriations committees are expected to report every year. I will attempt 
to determine members' preferences for spending for these agencies. 
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The random utility model also requires a set of exogenous member-
specific variables that can be used to predict members' preferences for appro-
priations. There are several types of such variables. Disaggregated macro-
economic variables - - unemployment in particular - - are available from 
census data on congressional districts. Also, there are variables from the 
census data - - such as the amount of farmland in each district - - that 
are applicable for appropriations for certain agencies. Legislators' party 
affiliation and rankings by various interest groups also provide means of 
predicting preferences for different agencies. Republicans are expected to 
be more likely to support spending for Department of Defense activities. 
ADA scores can be used to predict opposition to defense spending, while 
higher National Farmers Union scores should predict support for agriculture 
spending. Thus my estimates of agency spending will be based on district 
characteristi<:s, party affiliation, and interest-group voting scores, as well as 
exogenous, nation-wide macro economic variables. 
Once estimates can be made of members' true ideal points, the me-
dians of different groups can be determined. Calculating the medians is a 
straightforward task. An estimate of each individual legislator's ideal point 
can be computed using the coefficients estimated from the random utility 
model and the exogenous variables for the individual legislator. Since it is 
possible to compute the ideal point for each member of a committee, then 
it is straightforward to determine the committee median. In fact the median 
for any group can be calculated, including the median of the majority party 
members on the floor. This allows a determination to be made as to whether 
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the chamber wanted to appropriate more or less than the committee without 
relying on the reported figures from either group. 
The Data 
Most of the legislator specific variables are problematic in that they 
would not a priori be expected to be correlated with many of the spending 
variables for different agencies. There is no particular reason to expect 
a member's ADA score, or the available district characteristics, to predict 
his/her desired level of spending by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. However, being able 
to predict spending on some agencies is sufficient to perform the necessary 
tests. 
I use the percentage change in real appropriations for each agency as 
the spending variable. Thus in the random utility model presented earlier; 
s1 is defined as 
s 1 = log(App(t)) - log(App(t - 1)) 
and 
s0 = log(RP(t))- log(App(t - 1)), 
where App(t) represents the agencies' level of funding at timet according to 
the conference report, App(t - 1) is the actual amount appropriated for the 
agency in the prior year, and RP(t) is the reversionary point, or the level of 
funding the agency would operate under if the two chambers cannot reach 
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an agreement on a level of funding. 14 All amounts are expressed in constant 
dollars. Hence for many agencies the rate of growth is negative during this 
period because of inflation. However, the status quo would be an even 
greater reduction, not zero. 
Thus the model estimates the legislators' preferences for changes in 
spending. The independent variables are not lagged. Thus it is hypothesized 
that a high rate of inflation - - rather than a rising inflation rate - - will 
cause legislators to want to decrease each agency's spending. Similarly, it 
is postulated that a high rate of unemployment-- rather than a change in 
unemployment - - will cause legislators to wish to increase the amount of 
spending by each agency. 
- The agency-specific exogenous variables and the interest group ratings 
are also not lagged. Thus the models postulate that members of Congress 
with higher amounts of farmland in their districts will always want to increase 
the amount of spending by the Farm Bureau more than their ·colleagues 
will. Similarly, members with higher ADA scores are postulated to want to 
increase the spending by OSHA more than their colleagues. (These variables 
can not be lagged. Census data is only available at ten-year intervals. And 
it is impossible to compare ADA scores over time, though at any one point 
in time they expose cross-sectional variation among members of Congress.) 
[Table la About Here] 
The data becomes problematic when the existence of roll-call votes, 
and their results, are examined. Table la gives the years for which there 
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Table IV· la 
Roll Call Votes on Conference Reports : FY74 · FY81 
FISCAL YEAR FY74 FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 
AGRICULTURE H H H H H H 
DOD H H H s H H s 
DC H H H s H s s 
FOREIGN ASST. H H H s H s H s 
HUD H s H H H H s 
INTERIOR H H H H H s H 
HEW H s H s H H s 
LEGISLATIVE H H H H H H 
MIL. CONST. H s H H H s H 
POWER/WATER H H H H H 
STATE DEPT. H s H s H H H S H 
TRANSP. DEPT. H H H H s 
TREASURY H H H H S 
EDUCATION H s H 
ENERGY H S 








were roll call votes on each appropriations bill. The lack of sufficient series 
of Senate votes makes estimating the random utility model for the Senate 
impossible. Sufficient votes are available on the House side. However, many 
of these bills pass with margins of over 80%; meaning that there will be very 
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little information in each vote. The number of no-votes is extremely low. 
For the 8 years analyzed there are 88 no-votes on Agriculture, 294 no-votes 
on DoD, and 216 no-votes on Military Construction. This contrasts with 
2422, 1985, and 2059 yes-votes, respectively. Hence it is not surprising that 
it is difficult to generate very good fits with the models for ideal points. 
However, the points estimated do satisfy the statistical requirement of being 
unbiased. 
[Table lb About Here] 
Comparing the interest group ratings of the populations of no-voters 
to the populations of yes-voters offers some consolation (Table 1b). The two 
sets of voters on each bill clearly look different from each other. The mean 
ADA score of yes-voters on DoD bills was twice the mean ADA score of no-
voters on DoD bills, and the differences between the means was significant 
at the 99% level. Similarly, the mean ADA score of yes-voters on Military 
Construction bills was almost twice the mean ADA score of no-voters on 
those bills, with the difference between the means again significant at the 
99% level. The same held true for Agriculture legislation and NFU scores. 
The mean NFU score for yes-voters on Agriculture was almost twice the 
mean NFU score of yes-voters, with the difference again significant at the 
99% level. These figures suggest that these votes do have the potential to 
reveal preferences. If the interested group scores are accepted to measure 
88 
TABLE IV- 1b 
Means of Interest Group Scores by Vote 
Ag Voters NFU Scores 
No Voters Yes Voters 
Mean 32.93 61.48 
Std-dev 24.69 25.15 
N 188 2422 
DoD Voters ADA Scores 
No Voters Yes Voters 
Mean 83.69 36.33 
Std-dev 18.85 29.66 
N 294 1895 
Mil-Const Voters - ADA Scores 
No Voters Yes Voters 
Mean 77.85 39.12 
Std-dev 26.72 30.66 
N 216 2059 
what they claim, then it would appear that the legislators are voting as util-
ity theory would predict. More liberal legislators are opposing increased 
DoD spending, and legislators with low NFU scores are opposing increase 
Agriculture spending. _ 
This dichotomy between yes-voters and no-voters can provide some 
basis for the rejection of alternative hypotheses of rollcall voting behav-
ior. Given the position-taking pressures legislators operate under they might 
adopt voting rules whereby they refuse to vote in favor of legislation beyond 
II 
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a certain distance from their ideal points, assuming that their constituents 
may not be versed in the concept of the status quo. Also, while it is assumed 
here that the appropriations process is a one-shot game, the fact is that it 
is played every year. Legislators might withhold votes from bills they pre-
fer to the status quo, in order to influence future legislation. Hence some 
evidence that legislators appear to vote in a way consistent with making a 
choice between the status quo and the available bill is useful. 
I reduced the sample to those agencies for which the necessary time 
series of roll call votes was available, and for which I could produce rea-
sonable sets of independent variables that would a priori be expected to be 
predictors of legislators' ideal points for those agencies. These agencies are 
listed in Table 2a. Table 2b shows the variables used to estimate ideal points 
for the agencies contained in each of 4 appropriations bills. 
Results 
Hl 
[Tables 2a and 2b About Here] 
Hypothesis Hl - - that the committee will influence the chamber's re-
port provided the strategic situation in conference is favorable to the com-
mittee - - can be tested with estimates of ideal points for members of the 
House only. I estimated ideal points for 13 agencies contained in the Agricul-
ture, Department of Defense, Interior, and Military Construction bills. This 
means that 13 separate random-utility derived equations were estimated. 
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TABLE IV- 2a 
Agencies used for Estimation 









bureau of land mgmt 
national park service 
bureau of indian affairs 
military construction 
The same set of independent variables were used for each set of agencies 
within a given appropriations bill. The results are offered in an appendix. 
The estimated coefficients are used to compute estimates of members' ideal 
points. The medians of these estimated ideal points are then used as esti-
mates for the true medians of the various groups of legislators: the floor, the 
committee, majority party members on the floor, the majority party mem-
bers of the committee, and the subcommittee. 15 The strategic situation for 
each conference was then determined based on reported figures. 16 This 
allowed a test of the previously specified model to measure committee in-
fluence within the chamber. The results for the test of Hl are reported in 
table 3. 
[Table 3 About Here] 
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TABLE IV- 2b 
Variables Used to Estimate Ideal Points 
Agriculture DoD Interior Mil-const 
Pres-App X X X X 
Election Year X X X X 
Unemployment X X X X 
Inflation X X X X 
Per-Capita Income X X X X 
%Non-white X X X X 
%Farm-Pop. X 
% Urban-Pop. X 
Party X X X X 
ADA Score X X 
NFU Score X 
West X X 
South X X X 
The two coefficients of the 6 variables are the coefficients of interest: 
they correspond to the influence of the committee on the House bill when 
the ordering of preferences in the conference confers an advantage on the 
committee, and when that ordering gives the advantage to the floor, respec-
tively. The coefficient of 61 is perversely signed, though not significant. It 
offers no support for the theory that the committee can influence the cham-
ber's report based upon an advantage in conference. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of 62 is positive, and though not significant, suggests that the com-
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Table IV- 3 
Hypothesis H1 
· Dependent Variable: H 
Independent Estimated t-
Variable Coefficient Statistic 
One 4.87 0.63 
Pres-App 0.66 10.39 
Unemployment -0.44 -0.66 
Inflation -0.25 -1.54 
House Democrats 0.02 0.09 
Election Year 2.56 2.77 
61(HC"- H " ) -0.26 -1.39 
62(HC"- H " ) 0.41 1.46 
agency dummy 1 -2.48 -1.29 
agency dummy 2 -1.79 -0.93 
agency dummy 3 1.82 0.77 
agency dummy 4 -3.87 -1.66 
agency dummy 5 -2.70 -1.32 
agency dummy 6 -1.10 -0.57 
agency dummy 7 -2.43 -1.27 
agency dummy 8 1.11 0.51 
agency dummy 9 -2.84 -1.46 
agency dummy 10 -0.30 -0.16 
agency dummy 11 -1.62 -0.89 
N (outliers omitted) 84 
R-squared 0.76 
corr. R -squared 0.70 
mittee can influence the chamber's report in precisely those cases when the 
, 
conference-committee theory predicts that the committee cannot. [When 
the strategic situation variable is dropped the coefficient on the difference 
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between the committee and chamber medians is insignificant.] 
These results immediately point up a big problem in all the effort 
m explaining committee deference: the dependent variable doesn't exist. 
There is no evi?ence that the floor defers to the Appropriations committee 
in making decisions on funding for agencies of the Agriculture, Defense or 
Interior departments, nor for military construction. The ex-post veto theory 
does not hold water as an explanation for committee deference, but at least 
partly because there is no committee deference to explain. 
Given the theoretical soundness of the notion of the ex-post veto, 
it remains to explain why it doesn't produce committee deference in the 
proscribed situations. The existence of an ex-post veto for the committee 
depends upon the conferees representing the committee, rather than the 
chamber or some other group, in conference. However, the appointment of 
conferees may be constrained by ~he chamber. In the next section I examine 
whether the chamber's constraint is really binding. 
H2 
If the committee does not have an influence on what the House reports 
perhaps it is because the committee is not represented in conference. Hy-
pothesis H2 suggests that the conferees will represent the floor Democrats, 
rather than the committee. At first glance, strictly speaking, the commit-
tee is represented in conference: in this entire data set fewer than 3 non-
committee members were appointed to a conference committee. However, 
if the chamber somehow constrains the committee to appoint conferees who 
closely represent the chamber's viewpoint; then there is no point in looking 
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for committee deference stemming from the conference procedure. Mem-
ber:ship on the committee does not necessarily indicate that a legislator is 
near the committee median. A central point of the theory developed above 
is that legislators are not homogeneous. Committee members are not iden-
tical, and will be distributed about the median. Hence the assumption tha~ 
conferees selected from the committee will represent the committee median 
is extremely crude. Luckily, it is also testable. 
Given the availability of the estimated ideal points it is possible to 
compare the preferences of the conferees, both to the committee and to the 
entire chamber. Table 4 compares the mean ideal points for the conferees, 
the floor, the committee, the subcommittee, and the floor democrats. Table 
Sa examines the differences between the conferees' mean, the floor mean, 
the committee mean, the subcommittees mean, and the floor Democrats' 
mean. 17 Table 5b examines which group is most frequently closest to 
the conferees' median. Table 6a compares the ordering of the conferee, 
committee, and House medians, while table 6b compares the ordering of 
the conferee, committee and House Democrat medians. Finally, tables 7, 
8a, 8b, 9a, and 9b look not at the median ideal points for these groups, but 
at the median NFU scores for these groups for the Agriculture bill, and the 
median ADA scores for these groups on DoD and Military Construction 
bills. In none of these tables is there anything to contradict the assertion 
that the conferees ' represent' the committee. Not only are the conferees 
chosen from the committee; but they are representative of the committee in 
their preferences for the legislation on which they are appointed. 
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TABLE IV- 4 
Means of Mean Ideal Points 
House Con- Sub- House 










-0.37 -0.38 -0.05 -0.00 1.16 
0.10 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.08 
95 95 95 95 95 
TABLE IV- Sa 



















Table 4 shows that the groups are not that different. The mean ideal 
point for each subgroup ranges from -0.038 (the committee) to 1.16 (the 
House Democrats). According to this table the conferees do appear signifi-
cantly closer to the committee than to the House Democrats. 
[Tables Sa and Sb About Here] 
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TABLE IV- 5b 
Frequency of <;;roup Closest to Conferees 
omit omit 
outliers outliers 
ICF" I < 50 ICF"I < 20 
ICF" - HD" I < ICF" - H" l 59 24 21 
(.60) (.33) (.37) 
ICF"- HD" I > ICF"- H *l 40 48 36 
(.40) (.67) (.63) 
ICF"- HD"I < ICF"- HC"I 32 16 13 
(.32) (.22) (.23) 
ICF"- HD"I > ICF"- HC" I 67 56 44 
(.68) (.78) (.77) 
ICF"- H "l < ICF"- HC" I 42 28 22 
(.42) (.39) (.39) 
ICF" - H "l > ICF" - HC"I 57 44 35 
(.58) (.61) (.61) 
Ratner than examining an aggregated statistic- the means of the vari-
abies- and looking for differences, Table Sa shows the average difference be-
tween the conferees' mean and the floor mean, the committee mean, the sub-
committee mean, the majority party mean, and the committee Democrats' 
mean. If the conferees are indeed representing the committee, rather than 
the floor, then the conferees' mean ideal point should be closer to the com-
mittee's mean than to the floor's mean. However, the means of these two 
differences are statistically indistinguishable from each other. By this mea-
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sure the conferees appear closer to the subcommittee than all other groups. 
This comes about simply because the conferees are chosen from the sub-
committee. While failing a test of statistical significance, this data at least 
suggests that the conferees more closely resemble the committee (and the 
House Democrats) than they do the floor. Table Sb summarizes frequency 
data for this concept (using medians rather than means). It indicates that the 
conferees are closer to the committee more frequently than the other two 
groups. However, further analysis based on the logical spatial implications 
of the unidimensional model does not support this inference. 
[Tables 6a and 6b About Here] 
TABLE IV- 6a 
Ordering of Medians -
Floor vs. Conferees vs. Committee 
No House CF* ~ HC* < H" 35 
Influence 44 
H * < HC* ~ CF* 9 
Move 
Towards He·< CF* ~ H " 13 
House 22 
H " ~ CF* < HC" 9 
Maverick HC" ~ H " < CF* 5 
Conferees 33 
CF* < H" ~ HC" 28 
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TABLE IV- 6b 
Ordering of Medians -
Floor Democrats vs. Conferees vs. Committee 
No Democratic CF" ::; HC" < H D " 50 
Influence 65 
H D " < HC" ::; CF" 15 
Move HC" < C F" ::; H D " 3 
Towards 7 
Democrats H D " ::; CF" < HC" 4 
Maverick HC" ::; H D " < CF" 9 
Conferees 27 
C F" < H D " ::; HC" 18 
While the mean difference between medians may seem uninformative 
in distinguishing the conferees' leanings vis-a-vis the chamber vs. the com-
mittee, the ordering of the medians may be useful. The ordering reveals 
how frequently the conferees moved from the committee position towards 
the House position. Table 6a shows the frequency of the 6 possible orderings 
of medians for the conferees, the committee, and the floor. Table 6b shows 
the frequency of the 6 possible orderings of the medians for the conferees, 
the committee, and the floor Democrats. Table 6a shows that in only 22 out 
of 99 cases were conferees appointed whose median represented movement 
from the committee. median into the expected interval between the commit-
tee median and the House median. In an additional 33 cases conferees were 
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appointed whose median was even further from the committee median than 
the House median was. Table 6b shows that in only 7 of 99 cases were con-
ferees appointed whose median represented movement from the committee 
median into the expected interval between the committee median and the 
House Democrats' median. 
[Table 7 About Here] 
TABLE IV- 7 

































Con- Sub- House 
ferees comm Dem 
19.88 23.63 58.50 
13.94 7.69 7.43 
8 8 8 
38.88 50.75 58.50 
18.47 12.97 7.43 
8 8 8 
62.23 64.75 76.88 
8.60 10.15 10.01 












The next set of tables compare ihterest group scores for the different 
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TABLE IV· 8a 






























































groups of legislators. ADA scores are used as measures of support for de-
fense spending, and NFU scores are used as measures of support for agricul-
ture spending. Table 7 indicates that the conferees for DoD appropriations 
are significantly more conservative than the entire chamber, however they 
are also significantly more conservative than the committee. The conferees 
appointed for legislation dealing with military construction look similar to 
the House and the committee. On agriculture legislation the conferees also 
look similar to the House and committee. 
[Table 8a and 8b About Here] 
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TABLE IV- 8b 
Frequency of Group Closest to Conferees 
Interest Group Scores 
ADA NFU 
ICF" - HD" I < ICF"- H "l 3 2 
(.18) (.25) 
ICF" - HD"I > ICF" - H" l 13 6 
(.82) (.75) 
ICF"- HD"I < ICF"- HC" I 3 2 
(.18) (.25) 
ICF" - HD"I > ICF"- HC·I 13 6 
(.82) (.75) 
ICF" - H· l < ICF"- HC"I 4 1 
(.25) (.13) 
ICF" - H • i > ICF"- HC"I 12 7 
(.75) (.87) 
Table 8a appears similar to its counterpart for ideal points (table 5a): 
it shows that the mean distance from the conferees to the subcommittee is 
less than the mean distance from the conferees to any other subgroup. And 
it shows that there is no significa~t difference between the mean distance 
from the conferees to House and the mean distance from the conferees to 
the committee. By this measure the conferees appear to be further. from 
the House Democrats than from the House. Table 8b gives the frequency 
data for this· distance measure. It shows that the conferees are closer to the 
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committee than to the House or to the House Democrats in 19 of 24 cases. 
This is statistically meaningful, but taking into account the data in table 8a it 
appears that these differences that favor the committee are relatively small. 
[Table 9a and 9b About Here] 
TABLE IV- 9a 
Ordering of Interest Group Score Medians -
Floor vs. Conferees vs. Committee 
ADA NFU 
No House C F" ~ HC" < H " 6 1 
Influence 10 1 
H " < HC" ~ CF" 4 0 
Move HC" < CF" ~ H" 0 0 
Towards 1 0 
House H " ~ CF" < HC" 1 0 
Maverick HC" ~ H " < CF" 2 2 
Conferees 5 5 




Finally tables 9a and 9b show the frequency of the different possi-
ble ordering among the groups. In only 1 of 22 cases did the conferees' 
median fall within the range proscribed by the ex-post veto theory (i.e., 
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TABLE IV- 9b 
Ordering of Interest Group Score Medians -
Floor Democrats vs. Conferees vs. Committee-
ADA NFU 
No House CF" ~ HC" < HD" 13 6 
Democrat 13 6 19 
Influence H D " < HC" ~ CF" 0 0 
Move H C" < CF" ~ HD" 2 2 
Towards 2 2 4 
House Dems HD" ~ CF" < H C " 0 0 
Maverick HC" ~ HD" < C F" 1 0 
Conferees 1 0 1 
CF" < HD" ~ H C" 0 0 
cr E [He- , H " ]) . In only 4 of 22 cases did the conferees' median fall within 
this range if the House median is replaced by the House Democrats m edian 
(i.e., CF* E [H C " , H n ·]). 
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Effects of the Conference Procedure on Final Outcomes 
Finally, it would be useful to offer clarification regarding the frequently 
asked "who wins" question (i.e., which chamber wins) regarding confer-
ences. Based on the preceding theory, one might postulate that the con-
ferees determine the outcome, subject to changes made by their strategic 
relation to the parent chamber. The Appropriations committees should be 
able to jointly influence outcomes when both of their medians are higher 
than the maximum of the House and Senate floor medians, or when both of 
the committees' medians are below the minimum of the House and Senate 
floor medians. Theory suggests that the conference report should be higher 
(lower) than it otherwise would be, if the true medians of both commit-
tees are higher (lower) than the maximum (minimum) of the two parent 
chambers' medians. 
However, the amounts reported by the parent chambers may constrain 
the conferees. The interval rule requires that the conferees cannot appro-
priate an amount outside the bound determined by the House- and Senate-
passed amount. If such an amount were contained in the conference report, 
then the entire report would be subject to a point of order in both cham-
bers. Also, the conferees do not vote as a unit on the conference report. 
Rather a majority of the conferees from each chamber must approve the 
conference report. Hence modeling the conference committee as a single 
actor is dubious. A plausible hypothesis is that the conference report is some 
linear combination of the House and Senate median, subject to changes if 
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the strategic situation provides an opportunity for the two sets of conferees 
to alter the outcome more towards their respective medians; i.e., report a 
higher figure if both sets of conferees desire more than both chambers, or 
report a lower figure if both sets of conferees desire less than both chambers. 
This situation is further complicated because the chamber desiring the 
higher appropriation is at a strategic disadvantage against its stingier coun-
terpart. To see this it is necessary to consider what would happen if the 
two chambers cannot agree on an appropriations figure. The simplest result 
is that no appropriations would occur, and the agency would be funded at 
level $0.00. However, this has traditionally not been the case. The "re-
version point" - - the amount of funding that would occur if the regular 
appropriations bill has not been approved - - has generally been the pre-
vious year's funding level. Recently this has changed, and now legislation 
specifically provides that if agreement between the chambers for funding an 
agency cannot be reached then the agency will be funded at a level corre-
sponding to the lower of the House or Senate passed figure. Hence if no 
agreement is reached the result is closer to the median of the "lower cham-
ber" . Since Euclidean preferences are assumed, this means that the lower 
chamber is better off with this outcome than the higher chamber. Thus with 
a more credible veto threat, the lower chamber should be able to achieve a 
result closer to its median (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1985b ) . 
While the resulting conference report may be postulated to be a lin-
ear combination of the Senate and House medians, the weights on each 
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chamber's median may change depending upon the strategic situation vis-a-
vis the conferees. This effect can be captured by a switching regime model. 
Each strategic situation corresponds to a different regime. And the switching 
regime model allows separ~te coefficients to be estimated for cases where the 
Senate median would be expected to be weighted more heavily, and cases 
where the House median would be expected to be weighted more heavily 
(Madala, 1983). By comparing the coefficients it is possible to determine if 
the two chambers medians are being weighted differently in the two situa-
tions. There are three regime variables: w , , w, and w h. w, is computed by 
setting it to 1 if the Senate has the strategic advantage, and 0 otherwise. wh is 
computed accordingly for the house, and w is 1 if w, and wh are both 0 , else 
w is 0. Three sets of coefficients are then computed. One set is multiplied 
by each regime variable and corresponds to the cases where the Senate has 




CR is the conference report (the final appropriation) 
w, = { 1, 
0, 
w = { 1, o, 
if the senate has a strategic advantage in conference; 
otherwise. 
if neither chamber has a strategic advantage; 
otherwise. 
Wh = { 1' 0, 
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if the house has a strategic advantage; 
otherwise. 
This specification also allows for estimation as to whether the confer-
ence report is biased towards either chamber's median. 
As noted in the previous chapter, estimating ideal points of Senators, 
and hence computing medians within the chamber was impossible. This 
seriously cripples any attempt to understand the effect of conferee selection 
on conference outcomes. What is needed to estimate the preceding model 
is to determine the strategic advantage (or lack thereof) resulting from any 
configuration of medians, as well as the medians themselves. In appendix II 
I show that even determining the ordinal ranking of-ideal points cannot be 
done with the available information (i.e., reported figures). 
Despite the dismal prognosis on inferring actual preferences from ob-
served figures, it is reasonably straightforward to examine whether or not 
reported figures by committees or chambers reveal anything about future 
success in conference. The switching regime model was estimated using re-
ported figures as components of the weighted sum producing the conference 
report, and to make determinants of strategic advantage. 
where 
CR is the conference report (the final appropriation), 
and 
w, = { 1, 
0, 
w = { 1, 
0, 
Wh = { 1• 
0, 
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if the senate has a strategic advantage in conference; 
otherwise. 
if neither chamber has a strategic advantage; 
otherwise. 
if the house has a strategic advantage; 
otherwise. 
The strategic advantage is based on the ordering of reported figures. 
A chamber has the strategic advantage if: 1) both committees are outside 
the interval determined by the two chambers and on the side of the interval 
bounded by the advantaged chamber; or 2) one committee is outside the 
interval determined by the two chambers and on the side of the interval 
bounded by the advantaged chamber, and the other committee is within the 
interval bounded by the two chambers. 
Table VI - 1 here 
Table VI- 1 
advantage N variable coef. t-stat 
constant 0.04 0.22 
Senate 47 senate-report 0.76 10.50 
house-report 0.18 2.95 
House 37 senate-report 0.56 6.14 
house-report 0.45 5.22 
neither 277 senate-report 0.58 24.95 
chamber house-report 0.37 16.11 
The results did give some support to the theory that committee prefer-
ences (if the reported figures were surrogates for preferences) do influence 
... 
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conference outcomes. The Senate figure was weighted significantly higher 
in those cases where the senate had a strategic advantage vis-a-vis the con-
ference procedure, compared to cases where the Senate did not have the 
strategic advantage. And the House figure was weighted highest when the 
House had a strategic advantage than when it did not. Overall the model 
confirmed prior researchers observations that the Senate seems to do better 
(based on reported figures) on appropriations conferences. 
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Conclusion 
I have described a set of hypotheses regarding the behavior of congres-
sional actors in the conference committee procedure. The hypotheses are 
theoretically motivated, assuming each actor behaves strategically to maxi-
mize his/her/its utility. While existing theory offers no unique equilibrium 
solution to the two-person bargaining problem, by assuming that a "split-the-
difference" approach is taken I test the applicability of the Nash bargaining 
solution to the conference committee procedure. I have described econo-
metric methods to test several competing hypotheses of how each committee 
and each parent chamber acts given its perceived preferences of other actors 
in the Congressional process. 
I claimed that one of the contributions of this work was to apply an 
econometric method to a large scale test of committee influence. That task 
turned out to be formidable; I was not able to generate sufficiently discrimi-
nating estimates of ideal points to perform conclusive tests of the hypotheses 
I set out to examine. In fact, the data was not available to even estimate ideal 
points for one of the two chambers of Congress. 
An open question then is what methodology is appropriate to test the 
hypotheses considered here? Appropriations bills may simply contain too 
many elements to test members' preferences on. There are two problems 
(though probably not independent ones) with these bills. First, the appro-
priations bills contain both levels of funding for given programs, and pro-
gramatic choices. As are elections, such bills are rather blunt instruments. 
When someone votes against the DoD appropriations bill it may be based 
111 
on a disagreement with the types of programs being funded, not the general 
level of funding. Second, the conference reports are themselves products 
' 
of compromise. Appropriations bills are unfortunately very good vehicles 
for buying votes with, for purchasing additional votes would merely require 
appropriating a little more money in the right direction. Hence our model 
of preferences for spending may be irrelevant when the legislator chooses 
whether to vote yes or no on a given bill. 
One might be better off finding a set of amendments that seem to 
measure preferences more precisely (i.e., MX funding , or the number ofF-
15s to purchase if we are examining the Defense Appropriations bill) and 
trying to infer from the legislative agenda on which amendments strategic 
voting is not likely to have taken place. The assumption of sincere voting on 
certain amendments seems like a small price to pay for the more revealing 
data it would make available. Also, the independent variables could be 
improved upon. Specifically, federal spending by district would probably 
be extremely relevant to a lot of legislation, and certainly to appropriations 
legislation. 
The conference committee and the potential strategic advantages it 
offered the standing committee were not found to have any influence on 
the final decisions of the House. It had been previously noted that conferees 
were almost universally chosen from the standing committee which proposed 
the legislation. It was assumed that this meant that the conferees would be 
sympathetic to the committee. Jn fact, the general assum·ption has been that 
the committee was a unitary actor which went to conference. However, 
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the selection of conferees did not appear to be designed to maximize the 
influence of the committee in conference; for the conferees were no more 
apparently sympathetic to the committee than they were to the floor. 
The second hypothesis tested was that the House defers to committees. 
This hypothesis has been maintained by Congressional researchers for 100 
years, and generated countless articles attempting to explain why it exists. 
However, except for Krehbiel and Rivers, previous researchers have simply 
utilized the success rate of committees on the floor to measure this; ignoring 
the possibility of sophisticated behavior by the committees. Krehbiel and 
Rivers did use actual preferences to test for committee deference on a single 
bill the Senate. I have attempted to correct the deficiencies in both types of 
work by estimating preferences, and doing this for a significant number of 
bills. I found no evidence of the deference by the floor to the appropriations 
committee that has been claimed to exist. The preferences of the members 
of the committee appeared to have no influence on the amounts the house 
appropriated. 
Given all the emphasis placed on committees - - both by political 
scientists and lobbyists - - it is important that we begin to prove, rather 
than simply assert, their influence. Alternatively, if we discover that their 
influence is so hard to prove that we are forced to infer that it does not exist, 
then this would also be a tremendously important finding. 
While all the conclusions stated here contain the implicit caveat that 
better data would allow better tests, they do nonetheless attempt to move 
forward from tests based solely on reported preferences. The tests described 
113 
depend upon knowing the true preferences of the actors involved. The use 
of such preference-dependent tests on a large body of data is viewed as a 
significant contribution towards identifying strategic behavior in Congress, 
as well as determining the facts about conference proceedings. However, 
the tendency of Congressional votes on final passage of bills to be lopsided 
consensus votes suggests that researchers will have difficulty applying the 
random-utility method to the large sets of votes needed to make statistically 
significant claims about Congressional behavior. 
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Notes 
1 Log-rolling explanations come in two flavors: 1-shot games or repeated 
games. The former depend upon preferences; the latter upon the frequency 
of interaction. 
2This is a strange assumption for a researcher who simultaneously co-
authored a paper on the inefficiency of public projects (Shepsle, Weingast, 
Johnson, 1979). 
3 Goss explained the region variable in an unconventional fashion, 
claiming that warmer climates might be better suited for bases. Appar-
ently Goss had strong priors about the locations and times of year of future 
military engagements. 
4Members of a committee need not report legislation that they view 
unfavorably. Once legislation reaches the floor it is generally managed by 
a member of the reporting committee and may be debated under a rule 
that gives committee members special privileges in introducing amendments 
(Bach, 1981). Even without such a restrictive rule, amendments from non-
committee members may not be forthcoming, for committee members are 
assumed to be more knowledgeable than their colleagues about the policy 
area of the bill. 
5 Any member may circulate a petition to discharge a committee of a 
bill before it. The petition is kept by the Clerk of the House and when it 
has 218 signatures a motion to discharge the committee of its jurisdiction 
is in order. If such a m·otion passes, the bill is normally considered by the 
.. 
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House. Only 27 bills have been discharged since WWII, and only 4 of these 
have eventually become law. However, there is no record as to how often 
the threat of a discharge petition has forced a bill out of committee. 
6 Thus the committee system represents a "Simple Institutional Arrange-
ment" (Krehbiel , 1987a). 
7 A case "ripe for obstruction" according to Krehbiel's terminology. 
8If C comes to the floor under a closed rule then we would say that the 
House deferred to the committee in passing the rule, as there is no puzzle 
after the closed rule has passed. Under a closed rule, the House would 
be expected to vote for the committee proposal as a majority of the House 
prefers it to the status quo. 
9 The conference report is closed to amendments on the floor, unless 
amendments in disagreement are reported. If such amendments are re-
ported, then they are the only sections of the conference report that are 
open to amendment. 
10By reporting amendments m disagreement (i.e., failing to come to 
agreement on differences between each chamber's version of the bill) the 
conferees are foregoing their final proposer power. 
11 Since the Speaker is assumed to be an agent of House Democrats a 
strong alternative assumption is that he/she would appoint a group of confer-
ees representing the median of the Democratic members of the House if the 
committee chair's proposed slate of conferees is rejected. This assumption 
would be consistent with the belief that members of Congress behave strate-
gically to obtain outcomes as close to their ideal points as possible. However, 
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the Speaker occupies a role similar to that of a committee chair. For the 
Speaker to appoint conferees representing only the Democratic members of 
the House would be equivalent to a committee chair proposing conferees 
representing only the Democrats on a committee. Acts so heavy-handed are 
rare in Congress. For many reasons-- fear of retribution, the frequent need 
for votes from members of the other party, etc. - - congressional politics 
are not played this way. To explain this is far beyond the scope of this pa-
per. I simply cite the observation, and use it to attempt to make a realistic 
assumption about the Speaker's behavior. 
12These assumptions may seem odd taken together, for they suggest that 
the committee chair may nominate conferees who will be rejected. As this 
is never observed, it would appear that the committee chairs are more so-
phisticated than this. It may be that the committee chair anticipates the 
Speaker's reaction, and implements the Speaker's decision rule him/herself. 
However, the effect on the committee' s influence would be the same. 
13Strictly speaking, the preferences of members of Congress are not 
known. However, inferences can be drawn about the median ideal points of 
these four groups from bills reported and votes taken during the legislative 
process. Ignoring the case for strategic misrepresentation, it is assumed that 
the committee- and the chamber-passed bills represent their true median. 
1 4 According to an arrangement in effect over this period, the reversion 
point was well defined. If no bill was passed, and agency would be funded 
at the minimum of: last year's level, or any chamber's appropriation for the 
coming year. 
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15Fourteen agencies are actually contained in these bills, but there were 
no figures available for Rural Waste, Water, and Disposal Grants for fiscal 
year 1974 through fiscal year 1978- making it impossible to estimate ideal 
points for the agency. 
16The reported figures have all the problems discussed earlier. However, 
as was also discussed earlier, it is impossible to determine actual Senate 
ideal points given the data available. The use of reported figures should 
not in theory change the results here; assuming that Senate misreporting is 
independent of the House committee-House floor relationship. 
17Means were used rather than medians for these comparisons because of 
the difficulties in determining confidence intervals around predicted values 
of medians. 
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APPENDIX I • 1 
Estimates for Agricultural Agencies Ideal Points 
Dependent Variable = Vote on Ag. Conference Report 
(1 = lower alternative; 0 = higher alternative) 
N = 2610 
1 = 188 (7.20 %) 
0 = 2422 (92.80 %) 
extension soil cons. rural elect. 
service service ad min. 
Q -1.89 -2.09 -3.55 
(0.06) (0.29) (2.27) 
Pres-App 1.35 0.18 0.73 
(0.13) (1.01) (7 .51) 
Election Year 16.35 -7.00 -1.14 
(0.12) (0.91) (2.22) 
Dist Unemp. -5.65 1.42 0.11 
(0.11) (0.31) (0.22) 
Dist Inf. 3.24 -0.94 0.09 
(0.13) (0.76) (0.92) 
Per-Capita Income -4.45 1.53 0.09 
(0.14) (0.73) (0.44) 
Non-white -0.17 0.05 0.00 
(0.12) (0.52) (0.54) 
Farm-Pop. 3.31 -0.94 -0.13 
(0.12) (0.67) (1.61) 
Party 11.23 -3.20 -0.44 
(0.13) (0.69) (1.68) 
NFU Score -12.58 3.50 0.09 
(0.12) (0.58) (0.17) 
West 3.01 -0.91 -0.19 
(0.11) (0.20) (0.30) 
South 2.83 -0.80 -0.10 
(0.12) (0.68) (1.76) 
Percent corr. 92.91 92.91 93.79 
119 
APPENDIX I - 2 
Estimates for DoD Agencies Ideal Points 
Dependent Variable = Vote on DoD Conference Report 
(1 = lower alternative; 0 = higher alternative) 
N = 2279 
1 = 294 (12.0 %) 
0 = 1985 (87.10 %) 
procure- person- oper & 
ment nel maint. rdt&e 
Q -156.06 -26.14 -13.89 -17.36 
(1.95) (1.87) (2.64) (4.71) 
Pres-App 0.92 1.23 0.24 0.43 
(2.87) (2.72) (1.41) (4.75) 
Election 8.86 -0.41 2.92 1.87 
(1.77) (0.27) (5.03) (3.59) 
Dist Unemp. -14.32 -2.97 -1.13 -1.37 
(1.38) (1.31) (1.57) (1.91) 
Dist Inf. -1.37 -0.11 -0.09 -0.15 
(1.03) (0.57) (1.10) (1.53) 
Per-Capita Inc. 1.23 -0.50 -0.26 -0.35 
(1.21) (2.05) (2.46) (4.34) 
Non-white 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.01 
(1.24) (1.16) (1.33) (1.64) 
Party 0.65 0.12 0.05 0.07 
(1.61) (1.54) (1.91) 3.12) 
ADA score -31.72 -5.82 -2.39 -3.03 
(1.54) (1.43) (1.69) (2.44) 
South 1.48 0.32 0.12 0.15 
(1.74) (1.66) (2.12) (3.70) 
Percent corr. 90.26 89.95 89.86 90.35 
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APPENDIX I - 3 
Estimates for Interior Ideal Points 
Dependent Variable = Vote on Interior Conference Report 
(1 = lower alternative; 0 = higher alternative) 
N = 2326 
1 = 172 (7.39 %) 
0 = 2154 (92.61 %) 
bureau national bureau 
geological forest of land park of indian 
survey service mgmt. service affairs 
a -9.39 1.39 -12.94 8.47 -11.17 
(3.21) (0.80) (17.12) (4.48) (2.16) 
Pres-App 0.21 0.22 0.40 0.56 0.17 
(7.40) (3.71) (44.97) (24.10) (1.36) 
Election 3.62 6.32 3.03 -0.90 8.24 
(3.88) (3.34) (11.33 (1.91) (3.78) 
Dist U. -1.11 1.67 -0.65 1.43 -1.75 
(1.88) (3.32) (3.35) (3.08) (2.23) 
Dist Inf 0.12 0.24 0.01 0.00 -0.18 
(1.74) (2.68) (0.42) (0.15) (1.91) 
Per-Cap Inc. -0.03 0.24 0.60 -0.52 -0.41 
(0.28) (1.63) (13.44) (5.82) (2.27) 
Non-white 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01 
(0.38) (0.63) (0.56) (0.57) (0.56) 
Urban-Pop -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.02 
(0.05) (1.24) (0.07) (0.19) (1.15) 
Party -0.47 0.02 -0.30 0.53 -0.06 
(1.00) (0.03) (1.20) (0.94) (0.09) 
West 0.01 -0.01 - 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
(1.34) (0.89) (1.65) (1.23) (0.92) 
Perc corr. 92.61 92.61 92.61 92.61 92.61 
.. 
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APPENDIX I - 4 
Estimates for Military Construction Ideal Points 
Dependent Variable = Vote on Military Construction Conference Report 
(1 = lower alternative; 0 = higher alternative) 
N = 2276 
1 = 216 (9.49 %) 









Dist Unemp. 16.11 
(0.77) 
Dist Inf -0.08 
0.17 










Percent corr. 90.42 
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Appendix II 
Determining Real Orderings based on Observed Orderings 
There are at least four actors and their corresponding medians and 
reported figures to consider: the House, House committee, Senate, and Sen-
ate committee. Even this allows for a major simplifying assumption: that 
the President's position has no effect on the outcome. I further assume that 
the status quo is always below what each of the four groups desires. And I 
will also assume in this discussion that none of the groups either have equal 
preferences, or report equal figures. Relaxing this last assumption would not 
really change anything, but keeping it allows a greatly reduced number of 
cases to be considered. Given this, there are now 8 points to consider. We 
observe the reported figures-- ii , J.iC:, s, 5c-- and from these we attempt 
to infer the ordering of the actual figures: H", He· , s· , and sc· . There are 4! , 
or 24 possible orderings of the reported figures. If we assume that the House 
and Senate are symmetric then we need only consider 12 of these orderings. 
However, I claim that examining only 1 example of reported figures will 
illustrate the necessary finding. 
Consider the following single case of observed figures: 
Table All - 1 Here 
This single case of observed proposals suggests a problem with inferences 
drawn from such proposals. If we observe three or more proposals, and 




Table All- 1 
possible 
true medians 
He· < H" < s· < sc· 
He· ·< H" < sc· < s· 
He· < s• < H" < sc· 
He· < sc· < H" < s· 
He· < s· < sc· < H" 
He· < sc· < s· < H· 
H· < He· < s· < sc· 
H" < H c· < sc• < s· 
H" < s· < He· < sc· 
H" < sc· < He· < s· 
H" < s· < sc· < He· 
H" < sc· < s· < He· 
s· < sc· < H" < He· 
s· < sc· < He· < H" 
s· < H" < sc· < He· 
s· < He· < sc· < H" 
s· < H" < He· < sc· 
s· < He· < H" < sc· 
sc· < s· < H" < He· 
sc· < s· < He·< H" 
sc· < H· < s· < He· 
sc· < He·< s· < H" 
sc· < H" < He· < s· 
sc· < He· < H" < s· 
motive to switch 
HC bluffs s or sc 
sc bluffs HC 
s bluffs HC 
sc bluffs HC 
H bluffs HC 
sc,s bluffs HC 
HC bluffs s or sc 
HC bluffs s or sc 
HC bluffs sc 
HC bluffs s 
can ' t be true 
can't be true 
can't be true 
can't be true 
can't be true 
can' t be true 
HC, H bluffs SC 
HC, H bluffs SC 
can't be true 
can't be true 
can't be true 
can't be true 
can ' t be true 
can't be true 
can say next to nothing of the true underlying preferences. For an actor 
on the end could be bluffing in either direction. In fact, given 3 or more 
ordered points the only configuration of true preferences we can rule out 
are those with true endpoints in reversed order from where they appear in 
the reported figures. This means that given any observed ordering, half the 
true orderings could have generated it. Thus with 4 actors, there are 12 true 
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orderings that could have generated any single observed ordering. Hence 
we cannot draw any inferences of the ordering of medians based on reported 
figures in the chamber-chamber case. 
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FIGURE ONE 
Configuration of Medians for 
Sophisticated Proposal by Committee 
[------------()-----------()----------()-------()------------] 
SQ H SPc c 
FIGURE TWO 
Configuration of Medians for Committee Gate-Keeping 
[---------------------()------()------------------()---------] 
C SO H 
FIGURE THREE 
Configuration of Medians for "Committee Deference" 
[-----------------()-------------()----()--------------------] 
SO H C 
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FIGURE FOUR 
Configuration of Medians 
for Effective Ex-Post Veto 
[------------------()-----()-------------()------------------] 
SO C H 
FIGURE FIVE 
Configuration of Expected Proposals for 
Speaker to Accept Committee Conferees 
[-------------()-----------()-------()--()-------()------------] 
SO H D SPc C 
FIGURE SIX 
Configuration of Medians for an Effective Ex-post Veto 
[ --------()---------()-----()--------------()-----------------] 
H D SO C . 
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FIGURE SEVEN 
Relative Medians on Minimum Wage Legislation 










Configuration of Medians for the 1977 Minimum Wage 
[-----------------o-----o----o---------o-----------o------1 
SO 1 H SPc C 







Configuration of Proposals 
for the Wage Level (1980) 
[---------()-----------------()----()----()----------------] 
SQ H CR C 
$2.30 $3.05 $3.10 $3.15 
Configuration of Proposals 
for the Tip-Credit (1980) 
[--------()--------------()----------()------------------] 
SQIH CR C 
50% 40% 32% 
Configuration of Proposals 
for the Small Business Exemption (1981) 
[-------()--------------()----------------()----------------] 
SQ/C CR H 
$250,000 $362,500 $500,000 
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